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A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR THE ABOLITION
OF CUSTODIAL CONFESSIONS
IRENE MERKER ROSENBERGt
YALE L. ROSENBERGtI
More than twenty years ago, the United States Supreme Court held
in Miranda v. Arizona that confessions would be per se inadmissible if
obtained by police who had failed to inform a criminal suspect of his
constitutional rights and the consequences of waiving them. Miranda's
rule aimed at dissipating the inherent coerciveness of custodial interro-
gation. Supreme Court cases subsequent to Miranda, however, gradu-
ally have eviscerated the landmark decision. In this Article Professors
Irene Merker Rosenberg and Yale L. Rosenberg criticize Miranda as
originally fashioned, examine its decline, and propose a new per se rule
that deems all custodial statements inadmissible. The authors note that
by disingenuously blurring the rule of Miranda, the Supreme Court has
made the law difficult to follow and has allowed-perhaps implicitly
encouraged-lower courts, prosecutors, and police to ignore the rights of
criminal defendants in the same disingenuous manner. The authors
conclude that their proposal is necessary to restore the rights that the
crippled rule of Miranda no longer protects.
INTRODUCTION
In a recent episode, Spider-man, the superhero of the newspaper comic
strip,' crashed through a store window, rescued a robbery hostage from a vi-
cious gunman in full view of police officers and television cameras, and then
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York University.
The authors wish to thank Rudy England, University of Houston Law Center, class of 1989, for
his excellent research assistance.
1. In reality, Spider-man is Peter Parker, a young newspaper photographer and sometime
graduate student, who was bitten by a radioactive spider, thereby becoming endowed with super
spider powers. Using his web fluid, Spider-man is able to swing from building to building and to
capture bad guys in his nets. Consequently, he is sometimes referred to as the "web slinger." His
ability to adhere to walls and ceilings also has earned him the sobriquet "wall crawler."
The Spider-man comic strip is syndicated in 500 newspapers. It has an estimated 60,000,000
readers in the United States and 75,000,000 in the world. Telephone interviews with Sara Rogers,
Permissions Editor of King Features (March 21, 1989), and Ted Hannah, Director of Advertising
and Public Relations of King Features (May 11, 1989).
The Spider-man comic strips in this Article are reprinted with the permission of their copyright
owner, Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc. See Letter from Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc. to
Yale L. Rosenberg (May 25, 1989) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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turned the web-tied perpetrator over to the authorities.2 But it was all for
naught:
Amazing Spider-Man
RE9AN7 OSUX HEl011N
© 1989 Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
And to add insult to injury:
© 1989 Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
The misadventure culminates in a philosophical dialogue between Peter Parker,
the web-slinger's alter ego, and Robbie Robertson, his editor at The Daily Bugle:
2. Houston Chron., Jan. 12, 1989, at D10; id., Jan. 13, 1989, at E8; id. Jan. 14, 1989, at E5;
id., Jan. 16, 1989, at D8; id., Jan. 17, 1989, at D8.
3. Id., Feb. 3, 1989, at E8.
4. Id.
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Although no mention is made of a confession, the allusion to police failure
to read Joe Doe his rights plainly refers to the warnings required by Miranda v.
Arizona.6 Never mind that the specifics of the cartoon are wrong-Joe Doe
never would have been released because conviction of a crime witnessed by
scores of persons will not turn on admissibility of the culprit's confession. 7 In a
broader sense, the author is right on the button; he has conveyed the popular
perception of our criminal justice system accurately. Robbie Robertson's civil
libertarian plea is tentative and conclusory, 8 while the fiery and idealistic young
5. Id., Feb. 5, 1989, Comics Section.
6. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda Court mandated a set of specific warnings as a condition
of admissibility of a suspect's confession taken during custodial interrogation. The police must ad-
vise the suspect that she has a right to remain silent, that anything she says can be and will be used
against her in court, that she has a right to consult with counsel and have counsel present during
interrogation, and that if she is indigent an attorney will be appointed to represent her. In addition,
police must obtain a valid waiver of these rights before a confession can be used against a suspect. Id.
at 467-76.
7. Given such overwhelming extrinsic evidence of guilt, no prosecutor would seek to introduce
Joe Doe's confession. If he did, it is quite likely that as long as the confession was not coerced under
traditional due process analysis, its introduction would be considered harmless error. Compare
Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372-73 (1972) (even if confession were excludable on sixth
amendment grounds under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), any error was harmless)
and Satterwhite v. Texas, 108 S. Ct. 1792, 1797 (1988) (harmless error doctrine applies to sixth
amendment violations under Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)) with Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 23 & n.8 (1967) (harmless error rule does not apply to involuntary confessions). See also
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 481 (noting that in many cases confessions were unnecessary because the police
had obtained evidence of guilt through other standard investigatory procedures).
8. In the world of Spider-man, his beautiful bride Mary Jane, his timorous Aunt May, and
Jonah Jameson, the wily and ill-tempered publisher of The Daily Bugle, Robbie Robertson may be
the authentic hero, i.e., the voice of wisdom, decency and sensitivity in an otherwise turbulent and
erratic world. At the same time, that Robbie is black and is speaking in favor of "technicalities"
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Parker gives a rather fulsome (for the cartoon world anyway) recitation of the
prevailing law and order perspective. It is the latter perspective that appears to
be the dominant social view in late twentieth century America.9 The public
apparently believes that, if it ever existed, police coercion is now a thing of the
past and that Miranda, which permits criminals to get off scot-free, is the star in
a national theater of the absurd.
The popular drumbeat against Miranda, which now is echoed by the
United States Supreme Court, 10 tends to obscure the factual and legal circum-
stances that led the Court to render Miranda's per se ruling-widespread and
unmonitored coercive police practices, uncontrolled by an ad hoc voluntariness
test that gave no guidance to police or courts and resulted in lawlessness in the
nation's police stations.1 Miranda's solution was a warning and waiver re-
quirement to be administered by the very individuals whose tactics had given
rise to the problem of coerced confessions. 12 Little wonder that some have
viewed Miranda simply as legerdemain, offering the appearance but not the real-
may amount to subliminal reinforcement of the notion that minorities are the primary beneficiaries
of the exclusionary rules.
9. The 1988 presidential campaign is a paradigm. Then-Vice President George Bush, a life-
time member of the National Rifle Association, was tall in the saddle. Michael Dukakis-American
Civil Liberties Union member, opponent of the death penalty, and, most importantly, liberator of
Willie Horton-was soft on crime and short on votes. See Shapiro, Why It Was So Sour, TIME, Nov.
14, 1988, at 18; see also Weinberg, A Democratic Retreat, THE NATION, July 5/12, 1986, at 12-13
(describing provisions of Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 that "turn[ed] back the clock
on protections of defendants' rights"); Dionne, A. CL. U. Examines Its Image and Pronounces It
Unharmed, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1989, at 23, col. I (A.C.L.U. poll "found that 78 percent agreed
with the statement, 'Protecting the constitutional rights of criminals makes law enforcement more
difficult,' and 62 percent said they thought the country 'had gone too far in protecting the rights of
persons accused of committing crimes.' ").
10. Indeed, it seems clear that a majority of the Court views Miranda as an unwarranted hin-
drance to effective law enforcement. For example, in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986), the
Court observed:
[A] rule requiring the police to inform the suspect of an attorney's efforts to contact him
would contribute to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege only incidentally, if at
all. This minimal benefit, however, would come at a substantial cost to society's legitimate
and substantial interest in securing admissions of guilt.
Id. at 427.
Similarly, in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), the Court noted that "[I]f the police
are required to recite the familiar Miranda warnings before asking the whereabouts of the gun,
suspects in Quarles' position might well be deterred from responding." Id. at 657. For further
elaboration on the Court's current view of Miranda, see infra notes 63-153 and accompanying text.
11. See Y. KAMISAR, What Is An Involuntary Confession? reprinted in Y. KAMISAR, POLICE
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 1-25 (1980); Equal Justice in the
Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, reprinted in Y. KAMISAR, supra, at 27-
49; A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents, reprinted in Y. KAMISAR, supra, at 69-76. The voluntari-
ness test wa ambiguous and ad hoc, examining a broad array of factors, including the police tech-
niques employed and the characteristics of the suspect. As Professor Grano has noted, this test
"seemingly made everything relevant but nothing determinative." Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and
the Legal Mind: Formalism's Triumph Over Substance and Reason, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 243
(1987).
12. See, e.g., Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1460-61 (1985) ("Like
requiring a convict to build his own place of confinement, there was something mischievous about
making the police the harbingers of good tidings to those they had just arrested."); cf Miranda, 384
U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The new rules are not designed to guard against police brutality
or other unmistakably banned forms of coercion. Those who use third-degree tactics and deny them
in court are equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about warnings and waivers.").
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ity of an effective mechanism against police overreaching.1 3 According to this
view, the decision's failing is not that it impedes the police, but that it does not
impede them enough: Miranda is unable to protect suspects from improper po-
lice practices and the overwhelming pressures of custody. Instead, contrary to
the popular belief, more rigorous safeguards, such as requiring counsel at inter-
rogations, are essential to deter official misconduct and facilitate the knowledge-
able exercise of free will.' 4
Such voices favoring a stronger remedy are far less audible now, however,
and it is not hard to discern why. The Supreme Court's general shift to the right
on Miranda questions, 15 as well as on other criminal procedure issues, 16 almost
necessarily has pulled the bounds of reasonable dialogue in the same direction.
Furthermore, the executive department's most recent assault on Miranda,17
13. See, e.g., Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul? A Proposal to Mirandize Mi-
randa, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1827 (1987) ("Although Miranda warnings may seem adequate
from the detached perspective of a trial or appellate courtroom, in the harsh reality of the police
interrogation room they are woefully ineffective."). One author who supports the decision has none-
theless observed: "Miranda does precious little to break the wall of isolation surrounding the target
of a custodial interrogation." Schulhofer, The Constitution and the Police: Individual Rights and
Law Enforcement, 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 15 (1988). Indeed, even some Miranda critics concede its
inefficacy, albeit as part of an argument for overruling the decision. See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 12,
at 1463 ("[S]tudies conclude that Miranda has done little to promote the exercise of the right to
silence or the right to have counsel at the police station." (footnote omitted)).
14. See, e.g., 0. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 205 (1973)
("Probably nothing short of a blanket requirement that no suspect be questioned except in the pres-
ence of his attorney could be expected to remove the elements of psychological coercion to which the
Court has so long objected."); L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 128-31 (1977) (recommending that
police be required to bring suspects immediately before a magistrate who will advise accused of the
right to remain silent and who will conduct interrogation in the presence of the suspect's lawyer).
One commentator states the position as follows:
[I]n my view, the Miranda rules do not go far enough in protecting the due process
and fifth amendment values that underlie the decision. I would propose the adoption,
either judicially or legislatively, of a per se rule prohibiting law enforcement authorities
from interrogating a suspect in custody who has not consulted with an attorney.
Ogletree, supra note 13, at 1830 (footnote omitted).
15. See infra notes 63-153 and accompanying text.
16. Compare Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) ("The deep commitment of the
Nation to the right of jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforce-
ment qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and must
therefore be respected by the States."), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("[A]ny
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel
is provided for him."), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) ("Having once recognized that
the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and...
therefore, constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.")
with Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984) ("[because] the Sixth Amendment does not re-
quire jury sentencing .... the demands of fairness and reliability in capital cases do not require it,
and.., neither the nature of, nor the purpose behind, the death penalty requires jury sentencing, we
cannot conclude that placing responsibility on the trial judge to . . .sentence in a capital case is
unconstitutional."), Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) ("We... hold that the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments... require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment unless the state has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his
defense."), and Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 (1976) ("There is no reason to believe.., that the
overall educative effect of the exclusionary rule would be appreciably diminished if search-and-
seizure claims could not be raised in federal habeas corpus review of state convictions." (footnote
omitted)).
17. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATrORNEY GEN-
ERAL ON THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATION (1986) [hereinafter ATrORNEY GENERAL'S
INTERROGATION REPORT] (discussing Miranda's deficiencies and urging that it be overruled).
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combined with escalating drug-related crimes, political calls for more stringent
law enforcement, and a flurry of scholarly activity from those critical of the
decision's per se approach,18 all appear to have helped create an atmosphere in
which simply holding the line on Miranda would be a victory for the advocates
of effective restraints on police.19 The question, though, is whether there is any-
thing left to hold. While not overruled, Miranda has been so diluted that its
main value today may be merely symbolic.20
In the present political climate, it may appear quixotic to ask for something
beyond an admittedly positive symbol-akin to ordering filet mignon during a
famine. Nonetheless, the present Court's treatment of Miranda has so many
negative aspects that the ruling itself basically has outlived its usefulness. 2 1 The
Justices' recent attempts to contain Miranda have led to mendacious jurispru-
dence in the confession area,22 which in turn has enabled the Court to avoid
addressing the very real problem of involuntary and compelled confessions. 23
Consequently, although Miranda's underlying premise that per se rules are the
most effective means of overcoming the inherently coercive effects of custody is
correct, its specific holding requiring police warnings fails to accomplish that
result and should be abandoned. 24
18. See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 12; Grano, supra note 11; Grano, Miranda's Constitutional
Dificulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHIi. L. REV. 174 (1988); Markman, The Ffth
Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A Response to "Reconsidering Miranda," 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 938 (1987); cf. Dripps, Against Police Interrogation - And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699 (1988). Although he views Miranda as "a valiant judicial
effort to reconcile" individual autonomy and law enforcement needs, Professor Dripps concludes
that "as long as obtaining confessions is seen as legitimate and even necessary, any serious restriction
on police interrogation is socially unacceptable." Id. at 734. He recommends disincorporation of
the fifth amendment privilege, which would enable the states to develop systems of in-court interro-
gation, and, as a corollary, he suggests "a per se exclusionary rule for any statement obtained by the
police from an arrested person." Id. at 702.
19. This is not to suggest that there is any shortage of articulate proponents on behalf of Mi-
randa. See, e.g., Saltzburg, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited: Constitutional Law or Judicial Fiat, 26
WASHBURN L. J. 1 (1986); Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHIi. L. REv. 435 (1987);
White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1986).
20. See Schulhofer, supra note 19, at 460 ("For those concerned only with the 'bottom line,'
Miranda may seem a mere symbol. But the symbolic effects of criminal procedural guarantees are
important; they underscore our societal commitment to restraint in an area in which emotions easily
run uncontrolled."). One commentator describes the symbolic role of Miranda and kindred cases as
follows:
I do not mean to suggest that Supreme Court decisions respecting suspects' and de-
fendants' rights are unimportant. Like the Pythia's cries, they have vast mystical signifi-
cance. They state our aspirations. They give a few good priests something to work with.
They give some of the faithful the courage to carry on and reason to improve the priest-
hood instead of tearing down the temple.
Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV.
785, 793 (1970).
21. Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("In truth, the
Betts [v. Brady] rule is no longer a reality.... To continue a rule which is honored by this Court only
with lip service is not a healthy thing and in the long run will do disservice to the federal system."),
22. See infra notes 82-101 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the distinctions between involuntariness under the fourteenth amend-
ment and compulsion under the fifth amendment, see infra notes 219-34 and accompanying text.
24. We could frame the proposal advanced in this Article either in terms of overruling the
Miranda warning requirement or "redrawing [its] bright line." See Oglet'ee, supra note 13, at 1829.
Either way, this proposal reflects dissatisfaction both with the original holding requiring police
1989] A MODEST PROPOSAL
In other words, Miranda's recognition that a per se remedy, rather than an
ad hoc totality-of-the-circumstances test, is the best method of preserving the
privilege against self-incrimination remains valid. Given the realities of police
detention and human nature, however, it is not possible for custodial admissions
to be the product of a suspect's free will. This Article, therefore, proposes a
different per se rule-namely, that out-of-court statements made by defendants
while in custody, whether or not the result of interrogation, cannot be used to
establish guilt in criminal trials. Although appearing to be radical, this position
is not too far removed from Miranda's original message. 25
Part I of this Article explores the underlying premise of the Miranda deci-
sion. Part II analyzes the means that the Court has devised to prevent the ruling
from accomplishing its goals, while Part III considers the institutional damage
wrought by these interpretations. Finally, Part IV examines various remedies,
including our own, for assuring that confessions are not compelled, and articu-
lates the values that a ruling prohibiting custodial admissions would promote.
I. THE MEANING OF Miranda
As the linchpin of our accusatorial system of justice, "the privilege [against
self-incrimination] reflects the limits of the individual's attornment to the state
and-in a philosophical sense-insists upon the equality of the individual and
the state."'2 6 As Chief Justice Warren explained in Miranda, "The constitu-
tional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government.., must
accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."'2 7 Yet, in explicitly applying
the privilege for the first time in the rough-and-tumble context of state custodial
interrogation,2 8 the Miranda Court sought to effectuate the lofty content of this
warnings and the Court's miniaturization of even that rule as well as its underlying values. See infra
notes 63-153 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 46-62 and accompanying text.
26. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967).
27. 384 U.S. at 460.
28. Although Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), first held that the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination controlled the admissibility of confessions elicited by law enforce-
ment officials, id. at 542, and although the Miranda majority relied on Brain in rendering its deci-
sion, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461-62, Justice Harlan, in dissent, contended that Bram's vitality was
questionable. Id. at 506 n.2 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice White's dissent argued
that although Brain had extended the privilege to prohibit coerced confessions, it did not preclude
the use of all confessions obtained through custodial interrogation of suspects. Id. at 527-30 (White,
J., dissenting).
Indeed, from a historical perspective,
[i]t may be conceded that in time of origin the confession-rule and the self-incrimination
rule were widely separated, and certainly Chief Justice White's language in Bram v. United
States to the effect that the fifth amendment guaranteeing the privilege "was but a crystalli-
zation of the doctrine as to confessions" is an historical blunder. Nevertheless, the kinship
of the two rules is too apparent for denial.
McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 Tax. L. REV. 447, 453 (1938) (foot-
notes omitted). Notwithstanding Brain's precedent, prior to Miranda compulsion under the fifth
amendment generally was viewed as referring only to legal compulsion. Because the police had no
legal authority to compel suspects to answer questions, the fifth amendment was considered inappli-
cable in the context of custodial interrogation. See Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1, 29 (1949). But see Saltzburg, supra note 19, at 8-14 (arguing that post-
Bram case law was not inconsistent with Bram; that both Brain and Miranda were correct decisions,
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Bill of Rights guarantee by requiring an almost pedantic recitation of warnings
administered by the very officials whose job it was to secure evidence of crime
and whose conduct over the years hardly could have inspired judicial confi-
dence.29 It was clear, however, that the Miranda majority's overarching con-
cern was no less than the broad policy of protecting "the inviolability of the
human personality."'30 The question, then, is how to reconcile Miranda's grand
design with the meek mechanism established for its effectuation.
Not only were the majority and dissenting opinions in Miranda 3 ' based on
widely disparate views of what actually happens during custodial interroga-
tion, 32 but the opinions also espoused broadly differing value choices that reflect
and posing the question whether the framers of the fifth amendment could have intended to allow
police officers to interrogate suspects in secret while denying that right to magistrates in open court).
Early cases excluding confessions generally did not rely upon the self-incrimination privilege.
Courts excluded confessions, instead, on reliability grounds, using the due process clause. MCCOR-
MICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 147, at 313 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972); 3 J. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 822, at 329-30 (1970). By the time of the decision
in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), however, it was clear that the reliability of confessions was
no longer the sole basis for their exclusion. As Justice Frankfurter stated, "[I]n many of the cases in
which the command of the Due Process Clause has compelled us to reverse state convictions involv-
ing the use of confessions obtained by impermissible methods, independent corroborating evidence
left little doubt of the truth of what the defendant had confessed." Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534, 541 (1961).
Thus, prevailing precedent when Miranda was decided clearly held that due process precluded
the admissibility of all confessions secured through impermissible police conduct, whether the self-
inculpatory statement was reliable or unreliable. After Malloy v. Hogan, 387 U.S. 1 (1964), made
the fifth amendment privilege applicable to the states, Miranda effectively transferred the custodial
interrogation voluntariness analysis from the due process clause to the self-incrimination privilege.
The Court still uses the due process analysis, however, in certain circumstances to determine the
admissibility or use of confessions. See infra note 199.
29. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 635 (1961) (reversing conviction of illiter-
ate, mentally deficient defendant who confessed after 10 days' interrogation and after being denied
counsel whom he had requested); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 444 (1961) (vacating 1936 conviction
of ill and inadequately fed 19-year-old mentally retarded defendant who was denied counsel, a hear-
ing, and access to family and friends for almost four days); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567
(1958) (reversing death sentence of fifth-grade-educated, mentally deficient 19-year-old who was held
incommunicado for three days, then gave a self-inculpatory statement after being told that he would
be protected from a mob only if he confessed); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68,70-71 (1949)
(reversing death sentence of illiterate man who was not informed of his rights, not given access to
counsel or relatives, confined in a small, hot room, and subjected to day-and-night relay interroga-
tion, and who confessed after threats to have his mother arrested); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530,
532-33 (1940) (reversing death sentence of defendant whose confession was obtained during repeated
questioning and alleged beatings on nightly "trips to the woods" from the jail); Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227, 239-41 (1940) (reversing death sentence of defendant subjected to five days of pro-
tracted, all-night questioning during which there was pervasive mob violence).
30. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.
31. Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Fortas joined the Miranda majority opinion, written
by Chief Justice Warren. Id. at 439-99. Justice Clark concurred in the result of one companion case,
but dissented in three others. Id. at 499-504 (Clark, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Jus-
tices Stewart and White joined Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion. Id. at 504-26 (Harlan, J., dis-
senting). Justice White's dissent was joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart. Id. at 526-45 (White, J.,
dissenting).
32. Referring to several manuals that guide police in custodial interrogation, the majority noted
that "the manuals instruct the police to display an air of confidence in the suspect's guilt," that
f[t]he interrogator should direct his comments toward the reasons why the subject committed the
act," and that "[t~hese tactics are designed to put the subject in a psychological state where his story
is but an elaboration of what the police purport to know already-that he is guilty." Id. at 450. The
majority noted further, "When normal procedures fail to produce the needed result, the police may
resort to deceptive stratagems ... [to] persuade, trick, or cajole [the accused] out of exercising his
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the ages-old tension between preservation of human dignity and solution of
crimes.33 The secrecy cloaking police questioning permitted the Justices to draw
contrary conclusions regarding its nature.3 4 The majority's extensive recitation
of common police practices used to elicit confessions from suspects revealed a
reality consisting of hidden trials taking place in stationhouse interiors, in which
skillful and intimidating police tactics inevitably overcame the will of the indi-
vidual who was held alone and incommunicado. 35 Moreover, in the majority's
view, any compulsion, no matter how subtly exercised, was improper because it
did not comport with human dignity.36 The dissenters, on the other hand, if not
subscribing to a genteel view of life at police headquarters, at the least consid-
ered Chief Justice Warren's depiction as extremely skewed.37 Far from being
inappropriate, the mild encouragement being given was, in the dissenters' view,
a reasonable if not laudable means to protect society. 38
constitutional rights." Id. at 455. "It is important to keep the subject off balance.., by trading on
his insecurity about himself or his surroundings." Id.
Justice Harlan, however, referred to police tactics generally as "minor pressures and disadvan-
tages," adding that "the Court portrays the evils of normal police questioning in terms which... are
exaggerated." Id. at 516-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting). According to Justice Harlan, "peaceful interro-
gation is not, one of the dark moments of the law." Id. at 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice White
agreed: "In fact, the type of sustained interrogation described by the [majority] appears to be the
exception rather than the rule." Id. at 533 n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
33. Chief Justice Warren wrote, "[To respect the inviolability of the human personality, our
accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual
produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple
expedient of compelling it from his own mouth." Id. at 460. "Even without employing brutality...
the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual libert[ies]." Id. at 455.
Justice Harlan disagreed: "What the [majority] largely ignores is that [the Miranda warnings]
impair, if they will not eventually serve wholly to frustrate, an instrument of law enforcement that
has long and quite reasonably been thought worth the price paid for it." Id. at 516 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Justice White's remarks were more graphic: "In some unknown number of cases the
Court's rule will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets.... As a consequence, there
will not be a gain, but a loss, in human dignity." Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting).
34. Because the majority opinion of Chief Justice Warren relied upon police interrogation
manuals to describe the practices used by police during custodial interrogation, it might appear that
the Court was apprised sufficiently as to its nature. See id. at 448-55. Notwithstanding the existence
of such documentation, the majority noted that "[i]nterrogation still takes place in privacy. Privacy
results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the
interrogation rooms." Id. at 448.
35. Id. at 446-55. For example, one police interrogation manual exhorted, "'Where emotional
appeals and tricks are employed to no avail, [the investigator] must rely on an oppressive atmosphere
of dogged persistence ... [and] interrogate steadily and without relent, leaving the subject no pros-
pect of surcease."' Id. at 451 (quoting O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
112 (1956)). A specific example cited by the Miranda majority took place in Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401 (1945). The prosecuting attorney in Malinski described the police action:
Of course, [the police] had a right to undress him.., and keep the clothes off him. That
was quite proper police procedure. That is some more psychology-let him sit around with
a blanket on him, humiliate him there for a while; let him sit in the corner, let him think he
is going to get a shellacking.
Id. at 407 (cited in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 452-53 n.17).
36. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457, 466. Chief Justice Warren stated, "[A]n interrogation envi-
ronment ... carries its own badge of intimidation... [that] is not physical intimidation, but [that] is
equally destructive of human dignity." Id. at 457.
37. See supra note 32.
38. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 516-17; see supra notes 32-33 (quoting statements of Justice Harlan).
Justice White stated,
This is the not so subtle overtone of the opinion-that it is inherently wrong for the police
1989]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
These differing factual and philosophical underpinnings are, of course, inti-
mately related. Had the dissenters been convinced that, as a general rule, police
interrogation practices were not merely unpleasant but unmistakably brutal,
their philosophical bent in favor of effective law enforcement and the concomi-
tant reliance on ad hoc reversal under the due process clause might have yielded
to a different approach. If oppressive custodial interrogation is thought to be
commonplace rather than aberrational, an institutional response, in the form of
a per se rule, is more likely to be viewed as imperative. Conversely, had the
majority considered police overreaching to be exceptional, it might not have
been willing to impose Miranda's per se approach.
These divergent views of reality may help to explain, at least in part, Why
the dissenters believed that the real effect of the decision was to outlaw all custo-
dial interrogation, 39 and why the majority, on the other hand, was willing to
settle for the limited expedient of police warnings.4° According to the dissent-
ers, if the majority's depiction of a chamber of horrors were accurate, the bland
set of admonitions that it had laid down in such detail was worthless; police
would lie about having given them, or would give the warnings in rote fashion
and then proceed to extract a waiver and a confession.4' A nationwide epidemic
of ruthless police interrogation hardly could be eradicated by distributing small
printed cards to the alleged culprits and instructing that the contents be read to
apprehensive suspects. If, however, the dissenters' view of the stationhouse were
the correct one, the result of conscientious police adherence to the new rules
would be an end to all effective interrogation.
At the same time, inasmuch as the majority could not have viewed its rul-
ing as fatally flawed from the outset, 42 it must have accepted, to at least some
extent, the dissenters' conclusion that the warnings would effect a sweeping
change and would preclude most interrogation. Realistic or not, the Court's
presupposition seems to have been that defendants, when actually put on notice,
would assert their rights.43 While we have the benefit of hindsight concerning
the utility of the warnings, the Miranda Court did not.44 Faced with evidence of
to gather evidence from the accused himself. And this is precisely the nub of this dissent. I
see nothing wrong or immoral, and certainly nothing unconstitutional, in the police's ask-
ing a suspect whom they have reasonable cause to arrest whether or not he killed his
wife....
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting).
39. Miranda 384 U.S. at 532, 535-36 (White, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 478-79.
41. Id. at 505, 516 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
42. See Caplan, supra note 12, at 1449 ("the Miranda Court did not intend to create an ineffec-
tive prophylactic"). But see Saltzburg, supra note 19, at 3 ("although Miranda was theoretically and
legally sound, it was destined to be an incomplete protective device, something that the Supreme
Court must have known when it handed down the decision").
Although Miranda was a compromise, in fashioning its ruling the majority presumably selected
a compromise that it deemed efficacious. See Schulhofer, supra note 19, at 460.
43. According to one commentator: "No one can be sure whether it was the Court's intent to
eliminate all, or nearly all, custodial interrogation .... Most likely, as naive as it now appears, the
Court expected the presence of counsel at the station house to be routine and the waiver of rights
extraordinary." Caplan, supra note 12, at 1448.
44. The Miranda majority did engage in an examination of the laws and procedures governing
the informing of criminal suspects of their rights in Scotland, in England, and by the Federal Bureau
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prevalent and overt police intimidation, the majority apparently believed that
advising suspects of their rights would create a markedly different stationhouse
atmosphere-one in which the accused would feel free to exercise constitutional
guarantees. 4 5
Indeed, at various points in the opinion, the majority indicated its view that
duly advised defendants would not waive their rights, but instead would request
counsel, thereby significantly reducing the number of confessions. For example,
the majority's discussion of waiver of Miranda rights, capped off by its applica-
tion of the Johnson v. Zerbst 46 standard-intentional relinquishment of a known
right-- 4 7made it clear that Miranda waivers were not to be inferred lightly.
Summing up, the Court admonished that "the requirement of warnings and
waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege
and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation." 4 8
Enforcement of the stringent waiver standard clearly was related to the
likelihood of assertion of the right to an attorney. In fact, the majority appears
to take for granted that rather than making a waiver, the typical suspect would
invoke the right to counsel under the new system, and that lawyers representing
such suspects at the police station would be commonplace. Thus, the Chief Jus-
tice asserted that "[tihe presence of counsel, in all the cases before us today,
would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police
of Investigation (F.B.I.) in the United States, an examination that arguably should have disclosed the
strengths and weaknesses of warnings. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 483-90. The Court's reference to
these "similar" systems, however, was to make the point that apprising suspects of their rights would
not result in a breakdown in criminal law enforcement. Id. at 489. The majority's analysis did not
concern itself with whether suspects in the counterpart systems actually invoked their rights. More-
over, if it considered that warnings administered to suspects by the F.B.I. and by officials in England
and Scotland resulted in assertion of rights, the Court may have entertained similar notions with
respect to state police officers in this country, even though their interrogation procedures may be
somewhat less genteel than those of their European and federal counterparts.
On the other hand, in their amicus briefs both the American Civil Liberties Union and the
National District Attorneys Association cautioned the Court against police administration of a
warning system. See Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 25-27, Mi-
randa (No. 759) and Brief for the National District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae at 13-
14, Miranda (No. 759).
45. This does not suggest that the Miranda majority's assessment of the efficacy of its remedy
was naive or foolish. At least intuitively, there is an incongruity between officials transmitting infor-
mation about the constitutional rights of defendants and at the same time coercing confessions from
them. Therefore it was not unreasonable for the Court to hypothesize that the warning system would
lessen police brutality and increase the assertiveness of suspects. See Saltzburg, supra note 19, at 21-
22 n.123 (arguing that the Miranda Court's failure to require warnings by a magistrate was "evi-
dence that it did not intend to wipe out the use of confessions, but only to see that suspects had some
fair chance to choose whether or not to speak when interrogated."); see also infra note 259 and
accompanying text (citing authorities who maintain that Miranda did not impede the police in ob-
taining confessions from suspects).
46. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (test for effective waiver of sixth amendment right to counsel is
intentional relinquishment of a known right).
47. This test is generally used for in-court waivers. Compare Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506,
513 (1962) and Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-25 (1948) (plurality opinion) (applying
Johnson v. Zerbst test to waiver of right to counsel, coupled with plea of guilty in Von Moltke) with
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (rejecting Johnson v. Zerbst standard with
respect to waiver of fourth amendment rights, on the ground that that standard applies only to in-
court waivers and those pretrial guarantees that are designed to protect the fairness of the trial).
48. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
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interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege."'49 Nor was the impact of
the presence of defense attorneys at the police station lost on the majority, which
specifically noted that attorneys might wish to be present during interrogation or
might advise their clients to remain silent. The Court took pains to insulate
defense counsel from attack for thus exercising "good professional judgment"
and thereby protecting their clients' rights.50 Moreover, while emphasizing the
"traditional function of police officers in investigating crime," 51 the majority
downplayed the importance of confessions in securing convictions.5 2 The Court
foresaw no significant impediment to crime control, pointing to the experiences
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and of several foreign countries that lim-
ited the use of confessions, to buttress its conclusion that Miranda's procedural
safeguards would not stymie law enforcement. 53 In sum, the Court's description
of the roles of both defense counsel and police in the post-Miranda framework,
as well as its denigration of confessions, all suggest that the Miranda majority
anticipated and intended that there would be a dearth of confessions.
The dissenters in effect corroborated this view of the majority's expecta-
tions. According to Justice Harlan, the aim was "to discourage any confession
at all," 54 and for Justice White the ruling was "a deliberate calculus to prevent
interrogations, [and] to reduce the incidence of confessions and pleas of
guilty."'55 On the other hand, neither dissenter shared the Chief Justice's san-
guine assessment with regard to law enforcement, predicting instead a "corro-
sive effect." 56
The disagreement was philosophical as well as pragmatic. Justice White
correctly pinpointed a major bone of contention between the two sides: "The
obvious underpinning of the Court's decision is a deep-seated distrust of all con-
fessions."'5 7 He, on the other hand, saw "nothing wrong or immoral" 58 in police
questioning suspects whom they had probable cause to arrest. For the dissent-
ers, confessions, at least voluntary confessions and those corroborated by other
evidence, were highly reliable and provided certainty of guilt.59
Justice White was at least partially correct about the majority's wariness
concerning confessions. Although acknowledging that not all inculpatory state-
ments were inadmissible and that confessions would "remain a proper element
in law enforcement," 60 the Chief Justice made these concessions in the context
49. Id. at 466. The Court did not, however, require that "a 'stationhouse lawyer' [be] present at
all times to advise prisoners." Id. at 474. The Rehnquist Court emphasized this point in its recent
decision in Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2879-80 (1989), discussed supra notes 109-16 and
accompanying text.
50. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 480-81.
51. Id. at 477.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 483-89.
54. Id. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 541 (White, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 543 (White, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 537 (White, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting) (quoted more fully supra note 38).
59. Id. at 516-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 478.
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of examples of volunteered statements such as sua sponte declarations by per-
sons telephoning or dropping into the police station. 61 As to custodial interro-
gation, however, the Court's attitude was quite different:
Even without employing brutality, the "third degree" or the specific
stratagems described [in police manuals], the very fact of custodial in-
terrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the
weakness of individuals.62
Since it is these confessions elicited during custodial interrogation that are gen-
erally contested, the Court's declaration that admissions would continue to play
a role in law enforcement appears to have been confined to a rather small
universe.
On the whole, therefore, it is fair to say that although the Miranda majority
and dissent disagreed sharply concerning the value of confessions and their util-
ity in the criminal justice process, both sides concurred in the view that a sweep-
ing change was in the offing-if not a world devoid of confessions, at least one in
which confessions were far less central in enforcement of the criminal law.
What actually occurred was not change, however, but merely the illusion of
change.
II. WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO Miranda?
Despite calls to overrule Miranda,63 the Justices have declined to do so.64
Instead, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have settled on a policy of chilling
containment of the controversial ruling.65 In a variety of ways, the Court has
undercut the decision, hollowing out its core while maintaining a pretext of via-
61. Id. Such cases do occur. For example, in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), the
defendant came up to a police officer on the street and confessed to a murder. Id. at 160. In Texas, a
man recently telephoned the police to tell them that he had killed his grandparents and to advise
them of his whereabouts. See McKay, Man Held After 911 Confession, Houston Chron., July 4,
1989, at A15.
62. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455.
63. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 438 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The
State of Iowa, and 21 States... strongly urge that... Miranda v. Arizona ... be re-examined and
overruled.").
64. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("I
would neither overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date.").
65. Thus far, however, the Court has resisted at least one major means of curtailing Miranda,
namely, precluding its assertion as a basis for relief in federal habeas corpus proceedings in the same
way that it has banned fourth amendment exclusionary rule claims under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976). Justice Powell alluded to this possibility in his Brewer v. Williams concurrence. 430 U.S.
387, 413-14 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor, concurring in Duckworth v. Eagan,
109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989), emphatically reiterated Justice Powell's position. Id. at 2881-85 (O'Connor,
J., concurring). If Miranda were made subject to the Stone v. Powell rule, such claims could not be
brought in federal habeas cases provided that the state had afforded the opportunity for full and fair
consideration of the claims, and that the attorney's failure to object to the illegal evidence in state
court did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,
375-78 (1986). Under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), however, along with other constitu-
tional claims, Miranda assertions cannot be raised in federal habeas cases if defendant has failed to
raise them properly in state court and cannot meet the "cause" and "prejudice" requirements of
Sykes. See id. at 90-91. See generally Rosenberg, Constricting Federal Habeas Corpus: From Great
Writ to Exceptional Remedy, 12 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 597, 598-627 (1985) (analyzing Stone,
Wainwright, and progeny).
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bility. In particular, the Justices have diluted Miranda by denying its constitu-
tional base;66 by allowing statements obtained in violation of Miranda to be used
derivatively and for impeachment; 67 by making the requirements for invocation
of Miranda rights stricter and the requirements for waiver more lenient;6 8 by
interpreting terms such as custody, interrogation and criminal proceeding in a
narrow manner;69 by carving a gaping hole in the decision in the form of an ill-
defined public safety exception; 70 and by validating police deception and trading
on the ignorance of suspects. 7'
In one line of cases, the Court has focused on custody as a prerequisite for
the application of Miranda. In interpreting "custody," the new majority
harkens back to Chief Justice Warren's description of the inherent coerciveness
of police station interrogation and seems to be concerned primarily with the
situs of the interrogation rather than with a suspect's ability to choose freely.
Thus, while the Warren Court ruled that interrogation in the defendant's own
bedroom by several police officers at 4 a.m. was custodial, 72 the Burger Court
held that Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) agents interviewing an unarrested
suspected tax evader in a private home was not.73 At the same time, under the
Burger Court, an I.R.S. interview of a defendant in jail on unrelated charges is
deemed custodial for Miranda purposes, 74 while a police interview of a parolee
who has come to the station "voluntarily" at the officer's invitation is not.75 The
new majority has found a court-ordered pretrial psychiatric examination in a
jail, used as a basis for testimony by the psychiatrist concerning the defendant's
future dangerousness in a capital sentencing hearing, to be custodial. 76 By con-
trast, however, the Court also has ruled that a putative defendant subpoenaed to
appear before a grand jury,7 7 a motorist stopped on the highway for a traffic
infraction, 78 and a probationer reporting to his probation officer are not in
custody.79
In these cases, the Court has, for the most part, not so much followed Mi-
randa as it has applied Miranda's terms literally. While it is clear that the Mi-
randa majority was most interested in dissipating inherently coercive
incommunicado police station interrogation, the Court's concerns extended to
preventing any compulsion. Miranda sought to assure the defendant's right "to
66. See infra notes 98, 101, 111 and accompanying texts.
67. See infra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 102-129 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 72-86, 130-31 and accompanying texts.
70. See infra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
72. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327 (1969).
73. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 348 (1976).
74. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968).
75. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495-96 (1977) (per curiam); see also California v.
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1124-26 (1983) (per curiam) (nonparolee suspect who voluntarily accompa-
nied police to station held not to be in custody).
76. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 466-69 (1981).
77. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 580-84 (1976).
78. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435-42 (1984).
79. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 440 (1984).
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exercise the privilege ... to remain silent if he chose or to speak without any
intimidation, blatant or subtle."' 80 Moreover, some passages in the Chief Jus-
tice's opinion in Miranda can be read broadly to require warnings "to protect
persons in all settings in which.., freedom of action is curtailed in any signifi-
cant way." 8' The post-Miranda decisions, however, generally insist on compar-
ing the whereabouts of the particular interrogation with the police station
settings described by the Chief Justice, rather than realistically focusing on how
reasonable suspects would perceive their situations. Because few environments
can compete with the stationhouse in terms of inherent coerciveness, an appre-
hensive suspect overwhelmed prior to arrival there is likely to lose the protection
of Miranda.
Using a kindred literalistic technique, in Allen v. Illinois82 the Court man-
aged to constrict the definition of a criminal case to make Miranda inapplicable
to a proceeding to declare a person sexually dangerous. Such actions could not
be initiated absent commission of a crime and bore all the indicia of a criminal
prosecution. Although the Court previously had invalidated labeling as a gov-
ernmental technique for avoiding constitutional safeguards, 83 in Allen the Jus-
tices relied heavily on the state's "intent that these commitment proceedings be
civil in nature."8 4 As the dissent noted, the Court's approach had the potential
for "evisceration of criminal law and its accompanying protections."' 85
Thus, the Court has adhered to a stringent, literal definition of custody that
generally precludes applicability of Miranda outside the stationhouse and some-
times even within, and, in like fashion, has defined criminal cases narrowly to
exclude proceedings plainly penal in nature. 86 In other contexts, however, the
Court has achieved the very same goal of constricting Miranda by using virtu-
ally the opposite technique, not only eschewing literalism but distorting the
plain meaning of the Miranda opinion. Cases permitting the use of statements
elicited in violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes illustrate how the
Court has been able to ignore both Miranda's words and its intent. The Mi-
randa majority stated broadly that, absent proper warnings, "no evidence ob-
tained as a result of interrogation can be used against" the defendant.8 7
Furthermore, the Court made no distinction between confessions and admis-
sions because "the privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual
from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distin-
80. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466.
81. Id. at 467.
82. 478 U.S. 364 (1988).
83. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970) (civil labels do
not obviate need for certain criminal due process safeguards).
84. Allen, 478 U.S. at 372.
85. Id. at 380 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court's holding in Allen also appears to run counter
to the dictum in Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972), that an "equal protection claim would
seem to be especially persuasive if [a defendant] was deprived of a jury determination, or of other
procedural protections, merely by the arbitrary decision of the State to seek his commitment under
one statute rather than the other." Id. at 512.
86. In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), the Court, however, did hold Miranda appli-
cable to misdemeanor traffic offenses. Id. at 428-29.
87. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
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guish degrees of incrimination. a88 In that same vein, the Court refused to differ-
entiate inculpatory and exculpatory statements, noting that if declarations were
actually exculpatory, they would not be used by the state. The majority then
proceeded to make explicit its concern that allegedly exculpatory statements not
be available for impeachment:
In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the de-
fendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demon-
strate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to
prove guilt by implication. These statements are incriminating in any
meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full
warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement. 89
Yet the Court in Harris v. New York 90 held that statements made by a
suspect regarding the crime for which he stood charged, under circumstances
that rendered them inadmissible under Miranda as part of the case in chief,
nonetheless could be used by the prosecutor to impeach the defendant's testi-
mony at trial. Chief Justice Burger acknowledged that "[s]ome comments in the
Miranda opinion can indeed be read as indicating a bar to use of an uncounseled
statement for any purpose, but discussion of that issue was not at all necessary to
the Court's holding and cannot be regarded as controlling."9 1
The Harris majority was preoccupied with the possibility of perjury, unper-
turbed with the obstacle to free testimony by the defendant that its ruling cre-
ated, and unconcerned that its holding might provide an incentive for unlawful
police conduct. To achieve its result, the majority embraced a pre-Miranda
fourth amendment decision permitting the use of unlawful evidence to impeach
a defendant with regard to collateral matters. 92
The Harris line of cases has been extended almost beyond its logical limits,
permitting, in one decision, the use of a statement taken from a suspect after
invocation of his Miranda rights, 93 and in another stopping short only when the
88. Id. at 476.
89. Id. at 477.
90. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
91. Id. at 224.
92. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 66 (1954) (allowing state to cross-examine defendant
about unrelated unconstitutional seizure of drugs from his home to rebut defendant's assertion in
direct testimony that he never had possessed or sold narcotics). As Justice Brennan noted in his
Harris dissent, there is a significant difference between using a defendant's statement to impeach him
about the crime with which he is charged and impeaching him with respect to a collateral matter.
Harris, 401 U.S. at 227-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The former does not permit the defendant to
make an unfettered decision regarding the right to testify in her own behalf. See id. at 229-30 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
93. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (holding that inculpatory information provided by a
defendant after he states that he wants an attorney is admissible for impeachment purposes when the
defendant subsequently testifies in conflict with the information previously provided. Given this
ruling, once the suspect asserts his rights, the police have no incentive to comply with Miranda.). In
New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979), however, the Court made it clear that Harris did not
apply to coerced or involuntary statements and held that testimony given by the defendant under a
grant of immunity could not be used to impeach him at his trial for extortion. Similarly, in Mincey v,
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), the Court held that "any criminal trial use against a defendant of his
involuntary statement is a denial of due process of law." Id. at 398.
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prosecution attempted to impeach defendant with his postwarning silence.94 In-
deed, in a third case, this time a summary disposition, the Court allowed use of
an unwarned suspect's silence for impeachment, since the state had not induced
his refusal to speak by complying with Miranda.95 Apparently lost in the shuffle
was the meaning of the fifth amendment right to remain silent.96
Closely allied to the impeachment issue is the question whether the state
may use any evidence obtained as a result of a confession secured contrary to
Miranda. Again, despite Miranda's assertion that "no evidence" secured in vio-
lation of its dictates could be used against the defendant,97 the Burger Court has
allowed such derivative use. The Court has achieved this result primarily by
refusing to view the Miranda warnings as of constitutional dimension. Arguing
that the Constitution prohibits only coerced or compelled confessions and that
Miranda is a far broader prophylactic rule, the Justices have suggested that
although Miranda will preclude admission of the confession itself, it will not do
so with respect to the fruits of an unwarned but uncoerced statement by the
accused. 98 Using this rationale, a majority has permitted the testimony of a
94. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (postarrest silence after Miranda warnings cannot be
used to impeach defendant's exculpatory direct testimony). In Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404
(1980) (per curiam), however, the Court distinguished Doyle, holding that cross-examination as to
why the defendant had not told the same story to police when he was arrested, in conjunction with
cross-examination as to why he had told police another version, was permissible. Id. at 408-09. The
Court further undercut Doyle in Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987), holding that there was no
error where a prosecutor attempted to violate Doyle by asking about defendant's postarrest silence,
but the trial court upheld defense counsel's objection and gave the jury curative instructions. Id. at
763-65.
In South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), the Court ruled that a police officer's failure to
advise the suspect that refusal to take a blood alcohol test could be used against him in court did not
violate Miranda, because the right to refuse the test was a matter of legislative grace and not of
constitutional proportions. Id. at 562-64. The Neville Court noted, however, that other warnings
given to the suspect made it clear that refusal to take the test would result in adverse consequences.
Id. at 565-66.
95. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam); see also Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S.
231 (1980) (holding that a defendant's prearrest silence may be used for impeachment, relying on
Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926), which allowed impeachment on the basis of the defend-
ant's failure to testify at his first trial).
96. Cf. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (holding unconstitutional both prosecu-
tor's and trial court's comment on defendant's failure to testify because such commentary "cuts
down on the privilege by making its assertion costly"). The privilege is likewise diminished if the
prosecutor can impeach the defendant with her silence even absent warning. The defendant is penal-
ized for failing to speak-something that, in theory in least, defendant is permitted to do.
According to one commentator,
If a person is constitutionally protected from being forced to give testimony which may be
used against him in a prosecution for crime, such protection would be illusory if the very
act of asserting the privilege constituted an admission of incriminating facts which could be
used as evidence against him in a criminal case.
Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 24 U. CHi. L. REV. 472,
473 (1957) (footnote omitted)).
97. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
98. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 449-50 (1974). The Tucker majority fastened on the
Miranda discussion that warnings were not the only permissible method to safeguard the privilege
and that states were free to find equally effective means of doing so. 417 U.S. at 443-44 (citing
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467). Miranda was quite emphatic, however, in its assertion that until such
other means were effectuated the warnings remained a prerequisite to the admissibility of confes-
sions. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 490-91. Interestingly, the Court has not attempted to explain
the basis of its authority to impose these nonconstitutional prophylactic safeguards on the states. See
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witness identified by a defendant given incomplete warnings.9 9 The Court also
has allowed the use of a consecutive statement secured after an initial confession
made in the absence of Miranda warnings even though the police did not tell the
accused, when giving him warnings prior to securing the second confession, that
they could not use his original statement.1°
These cases effectively deny Miranda's basic premise that custodial confes-
sions obtained without warnings are per se coerced. Moreover, from a concep-
tual standpoint, by dissociating Miranda from its constitutional moorings, they
permit the Court the greatest leeway in narrowing the decision's applicability.
Along with the Harris line of cases, these rulings have been among the Court's
most dishonest opinions, for they strike at the heart of Miranda while purport-
ing to be faithful to it. 101
A linchpin of Miranda was its strict requirements for waiver, for without
such restrictions the warning process easily could be subverted. Yet even
though Miranda mandated the Johnson v. Zerbst 10 2 test, with its heavy burden
Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 99, 119-20 ("[lI]t might be
noted that the conclusion that the Miranda safeguards are not constitutionally based poses an inter-
esting puzzle. If these safeguards are not derived from the Constitution, whence do they spring?");
see also Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80
Nw. U.L. REV. 100, 162-63 (1985) ("Arguably, therefore, the prophylactic rules of Miranda ...
might be defended as rules actually required by the Constitution. In all likelihood, however, any
attempt to provide a constitutional foundation for thdse rules would be strained and ultimately
unconvincing.").
99. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 449-50. Tucker involved police interrogation that took place prior to
Miranda. Since the trial in Tucker was conducted after the Miranda decision, Miranda's warning
requirements applied. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 435 (citing Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966)).
But see id. at 453-54 (Brennan, J., concurring) (suggesting that rules of retroactivity could be differ-
ent for a derivative evidence case such as Tucker, thus questioning the Court's decision of Miranda's
applicability to Tucker). It also should be noted that in Tucker the Court found that the police had
acted in complete good faith. Id. at 447.
The Tucker Court did not decide whether to exclude evidence obtained as a result of a violation
during a post-Miranda interrogation, but suggested that it would not do so when the testimony was
that of a live witness. Id. at 447, 449-50; cf. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1978)
(holding admissible the testimony of a witness whose identity was obtained as a result of an unlawful
search and seizure).
Justice O'Connor has argued that physical, nontestimonial evidence obtained as a result of a
defendant's confession does not violate the fifth amendment. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649,
665-74 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (Brennan, J.) (upholding the admissibility of a blood sample taken from
an injured defendant over his objection, on the ground that such evidence was not testimonial).
Another possible basis for using evidence obtained without giving Miranda warnings is the
inevitable discovery rule articulated in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), which permits the use
of evidence obtained in violation of the sixth amendment rights of the accused, if it is proved that
such evidence ultimately would have been found even in the absence of a confession disclosing its
whereabouts. Id. at 440-50.
100. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (discussed infra text accompanying note 164). The
Court distinguished prior decisions excluding the fruit of the poisonous tree unless the primary
illegality had been purged on the ground that in such cases it was a constitutional violation rather
than violation of a mere prophylactic rule that had produced the confession. Id. at 308 (distinguish-
ing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)).
101. See, e.g., Elstad, 470 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court today encourages
practices that threaten to reduce Miranda to a mere 'form of words,' . . . and it is shocking that the
Court nevertheless disingenuously purports that it 'in no way retreats from the Miranda safe-
guards.'" (citations omitted)).
102. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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of proof on the government, 1 0 3 the Court instead settled ultimately for a prepon-
derance standard in determining whether defendant effected a waiver.'14 Simi-
larly, although Miranda stated clearly that a valid waiver could not be presumed
from a suspect's silence or from the fact that a confession ultimately was elic-
ited, 10 5 rather than requiring explicit relinquishment of Miranda rights, the Bur-
ger Court has permitted waiver by inference. The Court reached this conclusion
in a case in which the defendant refused to sign a waiver and, when told that the
police wished to speak to him, said he would do so but that he would not sign
the form.' 0 6 The majority stated that an express waiver, whether oral or writ-
ten, while substantial proof of its occurrence, was not "either necessary or
sufficient." '
0 7
Unsophisticated defendants who purportedly waive their rights in these
sorts of situations in effect are making mistakes of law, for they surely believe
that their oral statements cannot be used against them, and they are not told
otherwise. '0 8 Thus, while Miranda was concerned with protecting the ignorant
and disfavored in our society, decisions such as this disclose a tacit willingness to
exploit such vulnerability.
In the warning and waiver context, Duckworth v. Eagan 10 9 is the Court's
most recent and one of its most effective invitations to the police to take advan-
tage of untutored suspects. In Duckworth, the Court upheld a warning advising
the suspect that a lawyer would be appointed "if and when you go to court."' 10
The majority determined that, because the prophylactic warnings were not
themselves rights guaranteed by the Constitution,1 1' they need not be given in
the precise form specified in Miranda. 12 The Court concluded that, in their
totality, the warnings given the suspect sufficiently conveyed the protections af-
103. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 ("If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attor-
ney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defend-
ant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to
retained or appointed counsel." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
104. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1986); cf. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 358
(1970) (voluntariness of confession under fourteenth amendment due process analysis can be estab-
lished by preponderance of the evidence).
105. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475-76.
106. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); see also Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523
(1987) (confession admissible when defendant said that he would not make a written statement in
absence of counsel and then orally admitted his guilt).
107. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373. But cf. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 ("An express statement that the
individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a state-
ment could constitute a waiver." (emphasis added)).
108. See Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 DENVER
L.J. 1, 15 (1970) (a study of post-Miranda defendants showed that 45% thought oral statements
could not be used as evidence).
109. 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989).
110. Id. at 2877.
111. Id. at 2880.
112. Id. at 2879-80. The Court's decision in California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981), did not
require a precise talismanic formulation of the Miranda warnings. Id. at 359. In Prysock, however,
the Court suggested that a warning with regard to the right to counsel made conditional upon initial
police interrogation would be invalid. See id. at 360. Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that, in
their totality, the warnings administered in Duckworth did not suffer from this vice. Duckworth, 109
S. Ct. at 2880.
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forded by Miranda.' 1- Justice Marshall noted in dissent, however:
[T]he recipients of police warnings are often frightened suspects
unlettered in the law, not lawyers or judges or others schooled in inter-
preting legal or semantic nuance. Such suspects can hardly be ex-
pected to interpret, in as facile a manner as the Chief Justice, "the
pretzel-like warnings here-intertwining, contradictory, and ambigu-
ous as they are." 114
The "if and when" caveat approved in Duckworth undermines the prior warning
given a suspect that an attorney can be present during interrogation and makes
it appear either that interrogation will be delayed or that the defendant will be
entitled to an attorney only at trial.1 15 A defendant's misunderstanding of his
right to counsel acts as an incentive to discuss the matter with police immedi-
ately, despite the absence of counsel, to extricate himself from the confines of the
stationhouse.1 6 Thus, after Duckworth, the warnings designed to advise de-
fendants of their rights may instead be used to mislead them and to induce igno-
rant waivers.
Of almost equal importance to Miranda's warning and waiver doctrine is
its insistence that any invocation of Miranda rights must be honored scrupu-
lously. The Court was most emphatic, saying that a suspect has invoked his
right to remain silent if he "indicates in any manner, at any time" such a de-
sire'17 The Justices nonetheless have held that, unlike waiver, invocation of
this right must be explicit and that a sixteen-year-old suspect's request to see his
probation officer was not a per se invocation of either the right to remain silent
or to an attorney. 18 The majority looked to "the unique role the lawyer plays
in the adversarial system of criminal justice,"' 19 thereby presumably precluding
requests for any trusted lay person as a per se basis for asserting Miranda
rights.' 20 The Supreme Court held that whether there has been a valid waiver
was to be determined by a totality of the circumstances test.1 21 In insisting on
an ad hoe standard for determining invocation of Miranda in such situations,
the Court is once again penalizing ignorance.
To prevent coercive overbearing of the suspect's will, the Miranda Court
ruled that invocation of the fifth amendment privilege would terminate interro-
gation and that the suspect's request for an attorney would likewise preclude
further questioning at least until the lawyer appeared. 2 2 Subsequent cases have,
however, treated these two prongs somewhat differently. Invocation of the right
113. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2881.
114. Id. at 2887 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 484 Pa. 349, 356,
399 A.2d 111, 115 (1979)).
115. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
117. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
118. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
119. Id. at 719.
120. See Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with Crime: Proposal for a
Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656, 687-88 (1980).
121. Fare, 442 U.S. at 725.
122. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
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to silence has not resulted in either a per se prohibition of further interrogation
or any other measures designed to overcome the effects of continued detention
and resumption of questioning. 123 All that appears to be necessary, at least
when the resumed questioning relates to another crime, is a renewed warning
after a relatively brief respite. 124 When, however, the defendant asks for an at-
torney, the police cannot initiate further interrogation as to either that offense or
an unrelated crime.125 Although it is true that the Court perhaps has been too
eager to find suspect-initiated interrogation,' 26 it also has ruled that once a sus-
pect requests counsel, her subsequent responses cannot be used to show that the
initial request for counsel was ambiguous. 127 The difference in treatment of
these two facets of the Miranda warnings may reflect that the Miranda Court
itself was more explicit about the effect to be given a suspect's request for a
lawyer, 128 or that the Court traditionally has been more protective of the right
to counsel than of the right to remain silent.1 29
Notwithstanding this seeming solicitude for the right to counsel, the Court
has been able to curtail applicability of that right as well by its interpretation of
the Miranda requirement of interrogation. Focusing on the police techniques
and practices discussed in Miranda, the Burger Court concluded that Miranda's
requisite prophylactic warnings apply either to "express questioning or its func-
tional equivalent"-to any police conduct that is likely to elicit responses from a
123. Justice Brennan suggested examples of such measures in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96,
116 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). His suggestions included requiring that the suspect be taken
before a magistrate "without unnecessary delay," and requiring that police await appointment and
arrival of counsel prior to resuming questioning. Id. at 116 & n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Michigan statutory provisions).
124. Id. at 104. The Court noted that the police immediately stopped the interrogation when the
defendant asserted his right to remain silent and resumed questioning two hours later. Id. at 104-05.
125. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that a defendant's incriminating state-
ment made prior to having access to counsel, but after first requesting counsel and then hearing a
taped statement by an alleged accomplice, was inadmissible); see also Arizona v. Roberson, 108 S.
Ct. 2093 (1988) (applying the Edwards rule to statements made about unrelated offenses and holding
that a defendant is not subject to interrogation about separate investigations prior to having counsel
available once he has invoked his right); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) (extending the
Edwards rule to the sixth amendment context, and holding that statements made during an interro-
gation following an asserted right to counsel at an arraignment are inadmissible).
126. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). In Bradshaw, the defendant, after first
invoking his right to counsel, asked "Well, what is going to happen to me now?" Id. at 1042. The
Court found that, although ambiguous, defendant's question had initiated a conversation regarding
the criminal charges rather than merely asking an incidental question concerning custody. Id. at
1045-46.
127. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984) (per curiam) (noting, however, that such statements
are relevant to the distinct question of waiver).
128. In Miranda, the Court's statement that interrogation must cease until an attorney was pres-
ent was made only in connection with assertion of the right to counsel. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
The majority fastened on this disparate treatment of the right to remain silent and the right to
counsel in Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104 n.10 (discussed supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text).
129. In Patterson v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988), however, the Court stated,
We... reject petitioner's argument, which has some acceptance from courts and commen-
tators, that since 'the sixth amendment right [to counsel] is far superior to that of the fifth
amendment right' and since '[t]he greater the right the greater the loss from a waiver of
that right,' waiver of an accused's Sixth Amendment right to counsel should be 'more
difficult' to effectuate than waiver of a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights.
Id. at 2397 (footnote omitted).
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defendant.13 0 Yet in the very same case in which the Justices announced this
seemingly broad definition, they applied it narrowly to admit a confession made
in response to a conversation between police officers intimating that a missing
gun might be found by handicapped children.13 1 Such a decision does little
more than encourage loud and provocative police dialogues in the presence of
the accused-the better to entice a "voluntary" statement.
Moreover, as a further inroad on the right to counsel, this time under the
sixth amendment, the Court now uses Miranda to facilitate incommunicado in-
terrogation of indicted defendants. In a series of decisions, the Court has stated
emphatically that the sixth amendment right to counsel does not attach until the
initiation of formal adversary proceedings and has used that factor as the basis
for denying such benefits to unindicted suspects. 132 Conversely, until recently it
appeared that indicted defendants did secure the benefits of an almost all-em-
bracing mantle of protection that prohibited the government from using state-
ments from the defendant obtained by the police, either directly or through
cooperating codefendants or informants.133 Yet, in Patterson v. Illinois1 34 the
Court held that an indicted accused who had not yet retained or been appointed
counsel and who made statements after receiving his Miranda warnings had, by
virtue of those warnings and his failure to request an attorney, waived his fifth
and sixth amendment rights to counsel. At least for defendants not yet repre-
sented, 135 this decision gives parity at the lower level to indicted and unindicted
130. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).
131. See id. at 303. Defendant Innis asserted his right to counsel after he was advised of his
Miranda rights. Id. at 294. He was placed in a police vehicle with three officers. One of the officers
began a conversation with another policeman about the missing shotgun, expressing fears about its
proximity to a school for handicapped children, Id. at 294-95. The Court found that there was no
reason for the officers to believe that the defendant would make an incriminating remark as a result
of their conversation. Id. at 303. Yet in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), the Justices held
inadmissible on sixth amendment grounds a statement by the defendant elicited after an officer re-
ferred to the necessity of finding the victim's body so that she could obtain a "Christian burial," a
speech that all parties in the case acknowledged to be tantamount to interrogation. Id, at 399-400.
The Brewer Court stated, "There can be no serious doubt ... that [the detective] deliberately and
designedly set out to elicit information ... just as surely as-and perhaps more effectively than-if
he had formally interrogated [the defendant]." Id. at 399; see also Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520,
527-30 (1987) (holding that it was not interrogation when authorities allowed defendant to speak
with his wife in presence of police officer).
132. Eg., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432 (1986) ("Because, as respondent acknowledges,
the events that led to the inculpatory statements preceded the formal initiation of adversary judicial
proceedings, we reject the contention that the conduct of the police violated his rights under the
Sixth Amendment."); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192 (1984) ("We conclude that the
Court of Appeals was wrong in holding that respondents were constitutionally entitled to the ap-
pointment of counsel while they were in administrative segregation and before any adversary judicial
proceedings had been initiated against them."); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972) ("We
decline to ... impos[e] a per se exclusionary rule upon testimony concerning an identification that
took place long before the commencement of any prosecution whatever.").
133. See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469-
71 (1981); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 269-75 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
399-401 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 202-07 (1964).
134. 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988).
135. Justice White stated quite explicitly in Patterson,
We note as a matter of some significance that petitioner had not retained, or accepted by
appointment, a lawyer to represent him at the time he was questioned by authorities. Once
an accused has a lawyer, a distinct set of constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving the
sanctity of the attorney-client relationship takes effect.
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suspects. t36 Thus, Miranda, designed as a shield for the accused, has, with re-
spect to the sixth amendment right to an attorney, been transformed into a
sword effectively limiting constitutional protection.
No matter how crabbed or limited these decisions interpreting Miranda
have been, it always seemed clear that if the conditions requiring application of
Miranda were met- criminal proceeding, custody, interrogation-the warnings
were mandatory and failure to administer them rendered any statement inadmis-
sible. Then, almost two decades after Miranda, in New York v. Quarles,137 the
Court created a "public safety" exception to Miranda, again emphasizing that
the prophylactic procedural safeguards were not constitutionally mandated. 138
The Quarles majority assumed that application of Miranda would deter suspects
from responding and that the ensuing cost of fewer convictions might be permis-
sible to protect the fifth amendment privilege, but it deemed any additional cost
in terms of public safety to be intolerable. 139 In return for the assurance of
public safety, the Court was willing to blur the original clarity of Miranda's
bright line' 4 0-a major impetus for the Miranda decision.' 4  Although the Mi-
randa Court itself conceded that some confessions, while voluntary under tradi-
tional due process standards, would be inadmissible if secured without the
prescribed warnings,142 the challenged admission in Quarles was not of that
kind. The defendant was captured in the middle of the night in a deserted super-
market, handcuffed, and surrounded by four armed police officers. Aside from
the negligible danger to public safety presented by these facts, 14 3 what is most
striking is that the defendant's confession bore all the indicia of coercion and,
therefore, may well have been inadmissible even under pre-Miranda
standards. 44
Id. at 2393 n.3. It is unclear why this distinction is significant. In prior decisions the Court merely
had stressed the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings as the triggering event for sixth amend-
ment purposes. See cases cited supra note 132.
136. The Patterson Court stated, however, that just because a challenged practice would be con-
stitutional under Miranda it is not necessarily valid under the sixth amendment. The Court sug-
gested that the police behavior in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (police advised counsel that
her client would not be questioned and failed to inform client that counsel had attempted to commu-
nicate with him), might not pass muster for an indicted defendant. Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2397 n.9;
see infra notes 146-53 and accompanying text (discussing Moran v. Burbine). See generally Note,
Sixth Amendment- Waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel at Post-Indictment Interroga-
tion, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 795 (1988) (critical analysis of the Patterson decision).
137. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
138. Id. at 655-57 (holding that immediately after apprehension officers could question un-
warned defendant regarding the whereabouts of a gun).
139. Id. at 657-58. The Court's discussion, however, indicates a rationale that turns not so much
on public safety as it does on who will bear the cost of constitutional protection. See id.
140. Id. at 658.
141. The purpose of Miranda's prophylactic rule "was... to give concrete constitutional guide-
lines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." Arizona v. Roberson, 108 S. Ct. 2093,
2097 (1988); see also Y. KAMISAR, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents, supra note 11, at 69-76
(analyzing the ineffectiveness of the voluntariness test).
142. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
143. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 674-76 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (noting that the New York Court
of Appeals had anticipated the majority's clever ploy by stating, "there is no evidence... that there
were exigent circumstances posing a risk to the public safety" (citations ommitted)).
144. For example, Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963), reversed the conviction of a
skilled worker of average intelligence with a prior criminal record, who was interrogated briefly on
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Although Quarles is ostensibly limited to the public safety context, it of
course opens the door to other exceptions that may end up swallowing the
rule. 145 Presumably, if that occurs, Miranda, encrusted with exceptions, will
fall of its own weight. For now, however, the hollowness of Miranda is perhaps
best demonstrated by the Court's decision in Moran v. Burbine.146 That case
upheld a defendant's waiver of Miranda rights notwithstanding serious police
misconduct in advising defendant's attorney that they would not question her
client and failing to inform the suspect that defense counsel had attempted to
communicate with him.147 Speaking for the Court, Justice O'Connor rejected
each of Burbine's constitutional claims. First, the police failure to inform him of
his attorney's attempted contact had "no bearing on the capacity to comprehend
and knowingly relinquish [his fifth amendment] right," and requiring police so
to inform a suspect would be too great a cost given "society's ... interest in
securing admissions of guilt.' 1 48 Burbine's sixth amendment right to counsel
had not attached because formal adversarial proceedings had not yet com-
menced. 149 Finally, Justice O'Connor said the police did not violate Burbine's
fourteenth amendment rights because their conduct would not "shock ... the
sensibilities of civilized society."' 50
The Burbine scenario is reminiscent of the practices delineated in the police
manuals quoted by the Miranda majority in justification of the need for an abso-
lute prophylactic rule.' 5 1 That these same practices still take place more than
two decades later and that they are in effect condoned by the Court strongly
suggests that Miranda has become nothing more than a talisman permitting po-
lice officers to engage in dirty tricks or worse as long as they recite the magic
the street and released. Shortly thereafter, the suspect admitted his guilt to police officers. At the
police station he again confessed after a half-hour interrogation. The next day he made additional
confessions, one of which he signed after being held for about 16 hours and being told that when he
signed it, he would be allowed to call his wife.
Quarles had apparently not raised a coercion claim, and the majority stated that it was a "ques-
tion for the trial court on remand." Quarles, 467 U.S. at 672 n.5.
145. See infra note 176 and accompanying text. In Baltimore v. Bouknight, 109 S. Ct. 571
(1988), Chief Justice Rehnquist stayed a lower court order holding that it violated the fifth amend-
ment privilege to cite a mother for civil contempt for refusing to produce her allegedly abused child.
In his opinion the Chief Justice analogized the case to Quarles, because its primary aim was not
essentially criminal, but to secure the safety of the child. Id. at 573.
146. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
147. Id. at 421-24.
148. Id. at 422, 427. "Because respondent's voluntary decision to speak was made with full
awareness and comprehension of all the information Miranda requires the police to convey, the
waivers were valid." Id. at 424.
149. Id. at 428-32. "Because... the events that led to the inculpatory statements preceded the
formal initiation of adversary judicial proceedings, we reject the contention that the conduct of the
police violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 432; see The Supreme Court, 1985
Term-Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 132 (1986) [hereinafter Harvard-1985 Term] (crit-
icizing, inter alia, the Court's sixth amendment analysis, because it looked to initiation of adversary
proceedings as the triggering event for appointment of counsel, whereas defendant was making an
independent sixth amendment claim that the police misconduct interfered with the attorney-client
relationship).
150. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 433-34.
151. For example, the "principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation
is privacy-being alone with the person under interrogation." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449 (quoting F.
INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 1 (1962)).
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formula-or a misleading variant- 152 beforehand.' 53
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL DAMAGE
Retention of a devitalized Miranda has many undesirable effects. The
Supreme Court's post-Miranda decisions have impaired Miranda's original clar-
ity, making it difficult for police and lower courts to determine the circum-
stances under which confessions may be obtained and admitted into evidence. 154
The result is not merely confusion, but a tacit encouragement of police over-
reaching and judicial circumvention.155 Moreover, Miranda's seeming vitality
152. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text (discussing Duckworth v. Egan, 109 S. Ct.
2875 (1989)).
153. See, e.g., Harvard-1985 Term, supra note 149, at 125-35 (stating that the Supreme Court,
in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986), "has afforded deception 'the cloak of law' ").
Justice Stevens' dissent argued that the government had failed to meet its burden of proving
that Burbine had waived his rights. Moran, 475 U.S. at 450-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He attacked
the majority's balancing approach to the fifth amendment, stating that it had the effect of trivializing
constitutional protections. Id. at 459-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also rejected the
"shock the conscience" approach taken by the majority with respect to the fourteenth amendment,
contending that "fairness, integrity and honor" should be the standard. Id. at 466-67; see also Colo-
rado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987) (holding that police need not advise a suspect of the subject
matter of the investigation before obtaining a waiver of Miranda rights).
154. Compare People v. Ferro, 63 N.Y.2d 316, 472 N.E.2d 13, 482 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1984) (con-
duct of police in placing stolen furs in front of defendant's cell held functional equivalent of interro-
gation) with State v. Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d 272, 423 N.W.2d 862 (1988) (officer's showing
defendant revolver recovered from defendant's bedroom held not functional equivalent of interroga-
tion); compare United States v. McKinney, 758 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that defendant
waived right to remain silent and rejecting claim "that his refusal to sign a waiver form automati-
cally rendered further questioning illegal") with United States v. Heldt, 745 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir.
1984) (holding defendant's refusal to sign a waiver form did not waive his Miranda rights and subse-
quent police exhortation to answer questions was improper); compare Martin v. Wainwright, 770
F.2d 918, 928 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 959 (1986) with Bryant v. Vose, 785 F.2d 364
(1st Cir. 1986) (divergent views regarding admissibility of derivative confessions under Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)). See also State v. Garcia, 233 Kan. 589, 664 P.2d 1343 (1983) (discuss-
ing cases with conflicting views regarding whether police solicitation of "background information"
constitutes interrogation); Note, The Public Safety Exception to Miranda Careening Through the
Lower Courts, 40 U. FLA. L. REv. 989 (1988) (analyzing inconsistent lower court decisions inter-
preting Quarles); Note, Confusing the Fifth Amendment with the Sixth: Lower Court Misapplication
of the Innis Definition of Interrogation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1073 (1989) (discussing lower court disa-
greement on applying the Innis standard for interrogation). See generally supra notes 63-153 and
accompanying text (discussing the various exceptions and qualifications engrafted on the Miranda
decision).
155. Even when the Supreme Court issues rulings favorable to defendants, in practice very little
of the newly created rights may filter down to the intended beneficiaries, because these decisions
must be applied by lower courts and police officials who are often psychologically antagonistic to
suspects and inclined to interpret expansive rulings in the most grudging manner. See Amsterdam,
supra note 20, at 792 ("appellate judges[,] .. . [t]rial judges still more, and magistrates beyond
belief, are functionally and psychologically allied with the police, their co-workers in the unending
and scarifying work of bringing criminals to book"). A fortiori, Supreme Court rulings limiting
suspects' rights may resonate more harshly than the Justices may have intended. See United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("If it should emerge from experience
that, contrary to our expectations, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule results in a
material change in police compliance with the Fourth Amendment, we shall have to reconsider what
we have undertaken here."); see also infra note 167 (discussing police misconduct resulting from
judicial relaxation of Miranda).
In addition to this institutional bias, Miranda is undermined by the Court's decision in Mc-
Mann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), holding that a defendant who claims that a prior coerced
confession induced her guilty plea is not, without more, entitled to a federal habeas corpus hearing,
id. at 721-24. In such a situation, the defendant can attack voluntariness of her plea only by showing
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effectively permits the Justices themselves to avoid devising meaningful remedies
to deal with coercive police interrogation.
Even Miranda's detractors on the Court ultimately acknowledged that the
decision had at least one virtue-the ruling created a bright line that made it
relatively easy to separate admissible from inadmissible confessions. 5 6 It was a
line that gave fairly explicit guidance to both police and the lower courts.t 57
Law enforcement officers knew that unless they gave the warnings and secured a
valid waiver, a suspect's statement could not be used to establish guilt. Even
lower courts hostile to Miranda had little choice other than to abide by its clear-
cut directives. 158 As in the case of laws governing commercial transactions,' 59
there is a virtue in having a rule of criminal procedure that is well known and
readily understood, 160 even if its application in particular circumstances-such
as when a confession concededly voluntary under traditional due process stan-
that defense counsel failed to give reasonably competent advice in this regard. The McMann ruling,
coupled with the extraordinarily high guilty plea rate in this country, means that the police incentive
for adhering to Miranda may be quite low. See, e.g., D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMI-
NATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 3 (1966) ("Roughly 90 percent of all criminal
convictions are by pleas of guilty."). The chances that any given defendant will proceed to trial are
relatively slim. See generally Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term-Foreword: Waiver of Constitu-
tional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1970) (noting Supreme Court's implicit
encouragement of the plea bargain system through opinions like McMann).
156. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 663 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part in the
judgment and dissenting in part) ("In my view, a 'public safety' exception unnecessarily blurs the
edges of the clear line heretofore established and makes Miranda's requirements more difficult to
understand."). But see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 544-45 (White, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Court's per se
approach may not be justified on the ground that it provides a 'bright line.' . . . Today's decision
leaves open critical questions... all of which are certain to prove productive of uncertainty during
investigation and litigation during prosecution.").
157. Cf Fare v. Michael C., 439 U.S. 1310, 1314 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers, granting
application for stay) (According to Miranda's supporters, "the rigidity of the prophylactic rules...
afforded police and courts clear guidance on the manner in which to conduct a custodial investiga-
tion.... [T]his core virtue of Miranda would be eviscerated if the prophylactic rules were freely
augmented by... courts under the guise of 'interpreting' Miranda").
158. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Myers, 431 Pa. 628, 637, 246 A.2d 371, 375-76 (1968) (Bell,
C.J., dissenting) ("in the last few years [this court has] invalidated guilty pleas, guilty verdicts, and
voluntary confessions of dangerous and undoubtedly guilty criminals on some recently invented,
unrealistic and farfetched interpretations of the United States Constitution"); State v. Largo, 24
Utah 2d 430, 432-33, 473 P.2d 895, 897 (1970) (Ellett, J., concurring and dissenting) ("The so-called
Miranda ... rules opened Pandora's box[,] are not based upon logic, reason or common sense[,]
should never have been pronounced in the first place and except for the power behind them should
not now be followed.").
159. As Justice Douglas noted in a speech delivered in 1949:
Uniformity and continuity in law are necessary to many activities. If they are not present,
the integrity of contracts, wills, conveyances and securities is impaired .... Stare decisis
provides some moorings so that men may trade and arrange their affairs with confidence.
Stare decisis serves to take the capricious element out of law and to give stability to a
society.
Address by Justice William Douglas, entitled Stare Decisis, delivered before The Association of the
Bar of the City of New York (April 12, 1949), reprinted in I AssOcIATION OF THE BAR or THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, THE BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO MEMORIAL LECTURES 283, 284 (1970); see also
Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 443
(1979) (describing post-Civil War jurisprudence as a sharp break from its antebellum counterpart, in
which the judges "had approached the process of adjudication with a light-hearted disregard for
precedent").
160. See Patterson v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 2405 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Such clarity
in definition of constitutional rules that govern criminal proceedings is important to the law enforce-
ment profession as well as to the private citizen." (citation omitted)).
A MODEST PROPOSAL
dards is excluded because of a defect in the police warning-may seem unfair or
unreasonable. 161
Twenty years later, however, certainty and predictability are going, if not
gone. 162 Other than in cases of outright coercion, officers no longer can know
what limits there are in securing confessions. At best, they realize that there is
now considerable play in the joints. At worst, they believe that a skillful prose-
cutor can argue away successfully any deficiencies in eliciting a suspect's state-
ment. Similarly, lower courts are asked to divine on a case-by-case basis
whether Miranda governs a particular matter or if the matter instead falls within
any of the numerous exceptions, conditions and qualifications that have been
engrafted over the years. 163
Indeed, it is no longer true that police need even administer the Miranda
warnings initially to assure admissibility of subsequent statements. Oregon v.
Elstad 164 held that, unlike traditional coercion, mere failure to give Miranda
warnings was not by itself a violation of the fifth amendment and that, therefore,
the defendant's second statement made after Miranda warnings were given was
admissible. The decision gives officers a blueprint for obtaining inculpatory
statements that will withstand judicial scrutiny despite circumvention of the
spirit if not the letter of Miranda. Under Elstad, after securing a confession
without giving the required warnings, the police need only follow up with the
prescribed admonitions without advising the suspect of the first confession's in-
admissibility. This should invariably prompt another statement from unwary
defendants who make the plausible assumption that they already have incrimi-
nated themselves.1 65 Had the Court explicitly advised police that this decision
provided a means to avoid the strictures of Miranda, the object lesson hardly
would have been any clearer. I66 Law enforcement officials also understand
winks. The danger of winks, however, is that they may be interpreted more
broadly than the Justices themselves intended and that they may prompt more
overt police misconduct. 167 At a minimum, decisions such as Elstad convey the
161. Cf. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 23 (1921) ("[t]he attempt to do
absolute justice in every single case would make the development and maintenance of general rules
impossible").
162. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 679 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("This
case is illustrative of the chaos the 'public-safety' exception will unleash.").
163. See supra notes 63-153 and accompanying text.
164. 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (also discussed supra note 100 and accompanying text).
165. Justice Brennan has described this process:
The experience of lower courts demonstrates that the police frequently have refused to
comply with Miranda precisely in order to obtain incriminating statements that will under-
mine the voluntariness of the accused's decision to speak again once he has received the
usual warnings; in such circumstances, subsequent confessions often follow as a "silver
platter."
Id. at 356-57 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
166. Dissenting in Elstad, Justice Brennan asked, "How can the Court possibly expect the au-
thorities to obey Miranda when they have every incentive now to interrogate suspects without warn-
ings or an effective waiver ... " Id. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
167. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("We must
remember that the extent of any [police] privilege we sustain, the officers interpret and apply them-
selves and will push to the limit."); see also supra note 155 (discussing various ways in which
Supreme Court decisions expanding constitutional protection are diluted by officials responsible for
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message that police should not take Miranda too seriously and that the Court
will stretch to uphold admissibility of confessions. From there, it is a short dis-
tance to the conclusion that it is the interrogator's job to get confessions one way
or the other, and that of the lawyers and courts to work out the niceties of any
resulting technicalities.1 68
The police deception of defendant and his attorney in Moran v. Burbine 16 9
and the Court's refusal to invalidate such conduct constitute clear evidence that
police understand this message and that the Court itself is apparently intent on
reinforcing it. In fact, the wink in Moran is even broader than the one in Elstad.
It suggests that, as long as the warnings are uttered (in line with the Court's
sporadic penchant for literalism), almost any accompanying subterfuge will be
tolerated-not only under Miranda, but also under the due process clause.170 If
the deceit in Moran was insufficiently egregious to violate due process, the police
necessarily must ask themselves what techniques short of the rubber hose the
courts will find constitutionally impermissible.17 1 Once such questions have
been invited, it is almost a foregone conclusion that answers will be sought. 1
72
The wedge created by Quarles will have a similar effect. Unlike the preced-
ing cases, however, this ruling eliminates the necessity of even giving any Mi-
randa warnings. To the extent that warnings act as an inhibitor of confessions
or that police perceive them as such, this loophole may prove irresistible.' 73 The
factual circumstances of Quarles suggest danger to public safety will be easily
established in a host of situations.' 74 At least where weapons are or may be
involved, the ruling invites law enforcement officials to commence interrogation
immediately after apprehending a suspect and to do so without administering
warnings. 175 Furthermore, the elasticity of the public safety concept allows it to
enforcing them). In an analogous context, Gold, Dead Officer, Dropped Charges: A Scandal in
Boston, N.Y. Times, March 20, 1989, at 9, describes how a police officer lied with respect to the
identity of an informer in an affidavit in support of an application for a warrant to search a suspect's
premises. Subsequently the trial judge refused to reinstate charges against the suspect because the
state's conduct was "egregious." According to the district attorney, "[T]he lie doesn't reach the
level of egregiousness the judge believes it does." Charge Dismissed in Boston Officer's Slaying, N. Y.
Times, March 30, 1989, at 8. Query whether the decision in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967),
holding that defendant has no per se constitutional right to require disclosure of informant's identity
on a motion to suppress unlawful evidence, encouraged, at least in part, such perjury.
168. Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 20, at 792 ("To a mind-staggering extent... the entire system
of criminal justice below the level of the Supreme Court of the United States is solidly massed
against the criminal suspect.... The result is about what one would expect. Even when the cases go
to court, a suspect's rights as announced by the Supreme Court are something he has, not something
he gets.").
169. 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (discussed supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text).
170. The Moran court held that "on these facts, the challenged conduct falls short of the kind of
misbehavior that so shocks the sensibilities of civilized society as to warrant a federal intrusion into
the criminal processes of the States." Id. at 433-34.
171. Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion reflected concern with the scope of the ruling: "The
possible reach of the Court's opinion is stunning. For the majority seems to suggest that police may
deny counsel all access to a client who is being held." Id. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 432 ('We do not suggest that on facts more egregious than those presented here police
deception might rise to the level of a due process violation.")
173. See infra note 176.
174. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
175. In Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), police questioned defendant in his bedroom about
the whereabouts of a weapon at 4 a.m., four hours after the crime. Finding that he had been in
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be enlarged to include not only interrogation of a suspect concerning the loca-
tion of a weapon but also perhaps questioning with respect to the whereabouts of
victims or armed coconspirators.1 76
To be sure, cases such as Elstad, Moran, and Quarles may be more subtle
and more complex than the police perceive. t7 7 But that perception is important.
custody, the Court held defendant's statement inadmissible. The Quarles majority distinguished
Orozco, asserting that,
the questions about the gun were clearly investigatory; they did not in any way relate to an
objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger
associated with the weapon. In short, there was no exigency requiring immediate action by
the officers beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a serious crime.
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 n.8 (1984). Thus, the Court may be suggesting that apprehensions immedi-
ately after the crime, as in Quarles, implicate public safety, whereas a delay of several hours, as in
Orozco, means that the ensuing interrogation implicates only investigatory concerns.
176. See, e.g., People v. Willis, 104 Cal. App. 3d 433, 163 Cal. Rptr. 718 (police effort to deter-
mine whereabouts of kidnap victim justified interrogation of defendant despite his invocation of
rights), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 877 (1980); State v. Kunkel, 137 Wis. 2d 172, 404 N.W.2d 69 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1987) (holding rescue exception to Miranda justified by Quarles and ruling police interrogation
of defendant who had invoked rights was valid, due to possibility that victim still might be alive); see
also Leon v. State, 410 So. 2d 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (although police violence and threats
thereof were directed at kidnapper at time of arrest to determine location of victim, the court found
his subsequent confessions not tainted thereby and consequently admissible), rev. denied, 417 So. 2d
329 (Fla. 1982). But see State v. Hazley, 428 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding question
as to identity of accomplice not within Quarles exception, but that error was harmless); People v.
Krom, 61 N.Y.2d 187, 461 N.E.2d 276, 473 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1984) (under state constitution, once
suspect invokes counsel, he cannot waive right to counsel without attorney, but this right does not
extend to case in which life or safety of victim is at stake).
177. For example, the majority in Elstad did not view the police behavior as improper in the
traditional due process sense, because although the defendant was in custody, he was in his own
home where his mother also was present. Further, the police did not tell him that he was under
arrest, and their questions were apparently neither sustained nor intensive. The police also did not
specifically exploit defendant's first confession to obtain the second one. See Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,
300-01, 315-16 (1985). The Court also emphasized that its ruling was inapplicable to situations in
which the police did use coercive techniques. Id. at 308, 315-18; see also id. at 312 n.3 (distinguish-
ing some 50 cases cited by the dissent, on the ground that, for the most part, they involved improper
police practices). In addition, it is unclear whether Elstad applies to derivative evidence other than a
subsequent confession. Id. at 319 n.2, 346-47 & n.29 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although conceding
that the Elstad decision marked a sharp break from the Court's traditional approach, Justice Bren-
nan felt constrained to warn police that the ruling did not amount to carte blanche authorization of
misconduct in the elicitation of confessions:
Nevertheless, prudent law enforcement officials must not now believe that they are wholly
at liberty to refuse to give timely warnings and obtain effective waivers, confident that
evidence derived from Miranda violations will be entirely immune from judicial scrutiny. I
believe that most state and federal courts will continue to exercise the "learning, good
sense, fairness and courage" they have displayed in administering the derivative-evidence
rules prior to today's decision.
Id. at 344 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
338, 341 (1939)).
Similarly, in Moran, the Court intimated that the police deception consisted of acts of omission
rather than commission, such as failing to tell defendant that his attorney was trying to reach him,
rather than giving defendant false information, Moran, 475 U.S. at 423-24; that the case did not
involve trickery of a sort that would vitiate the validity of a waiver, id. at 423; that defendant had not
requested an attorney, thereby triggering the protection of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981),
Moran, 475 U.S. at 423 n. 1; and that, because this was a precharging situation, the sixth amendment
was inapplicable, id. at 428. Further, the Court conceded that "facts more egregious" might give rise
to a due process violation. Id. at 432.
Finally, although clearly dimming Miranda's bright line, the Quarles Court's broad articulation
of a public safety exception ostensibly was balanced by its invocation of the time-honored phrase "we
hold that on these facts" to narrow the ruling. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655. Moreover, the majority
stressed the absence of compulsion in the traditional due process sense. Id. at 654-55 & n.5. In
1989]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Even if officials do not understand all the ramifications and nuances of the post-
Miranda determinations, what they do realize is that the Court does not like
Miranda and that in most cases it upholds police conduct and permits the use of
confessions. 178 The Court's message is not subliminal. It has been given clearly
and repeatedly: Miranda hinders effective law enforcement and will be disre-
garded whenever possible. 179
The Court's insistence, on the one hand, that Miranda is still good law and
its willingness on the other, to render decisions that reduce Miranda to insignifi-
cance, is a dishonest approach that can breed only disrespect for the law.' 8 0
Such disrespect can reach beyond the confession area and can manifest itself in
police misconduct, including perjury.' 8 ' If the courts can debilitate a crucial
decision while denying that they are doing so,182 it is reasonable to assume that
the officer on the beat will not be held to a higher standard. After all, both
institutions seem to be after the same thing-convicting criminals.
The loss of Miranda's bright line also will have an adverse effect on lower
court adjudication. Judges antagonistic to Miranda have been given numerous
mechanisms for evading its reach. Even those who conscientiously attempt to
apply the Supreme Court's decisions in this area must face a welter of rulings
whose overall effect is to make it unclear under what circumstances a confession
addition, the Court utilized an objective test to make the required determination. Id. at 656, Justice
Marshall was not impressed: "Disagreements of the scope of the 'public safety' exception and mis-
takes in its application are inevitable." Id. at 680 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
178. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
179. As noted by Justice Stevens in Moran,
The Court's balancing approach is profoundly misguided. The cost of suppressing evi-
dence of guilt will always make the value of a procedural safeguard appear "minimal,"
"marginal," or "incremental." Indeed, the value of any trial at all seems like a "procedural
technicality" when balanced against the interest in administering prompt justice to a mur-
derer or a rapist caught redhanded.
Moran, 475 U.S. at 457 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. Responding to the Elstad majority's conclusion that the police officer's original failure to
give the defendant warnings did not constitute coercion, Justice Stevens observed, "The Court ap-
pears ambivalent on the question whether there was any constitutional violation. This ambivalence
is either disingenuous or completely lawless." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 370 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Brennan noted further,
The Court's decision says much about the way the Court goes about implementing its
agenda. In imposing its new rule, for example, the Court mischaracterizes our precedents,
obfuscates the central issues, and altogether ignores the practical realities of custodial inter-
rogation that have led nearly every lower court to reject its simplistic reasoning.
Id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181. Cf. People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 371, 270 N.E.2d 709, 714, 321 N.Y.S.2d 884, 891
(1971) (Fuld, C.J., dissenting) (quoting and agreeing with New York County District Attorney
Frank Hogan that "'in some substantial but indeterminable percentage of dropsy cases [narcotics
and gambling prosecutions in which police officers allege suspects dropped the unlawful items in
officers' presence], the testimony [of the officers] is tailored to meet the requirements of search-and-
seizure rulings.' "); People v. McMurty, 64 Misc. 2d 63, 64, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196 (N.Y. City Ct.
1970) ("It . . .becomes apparent that policemen are committing perjury at least in some of [the
dropsy cases], and perhaps in nearly all of them."); Younger, The Perjury Routine, 3 CRtM. L. BULL,
551, 551 (1967) ("Every lawyer who practices in the criminal courts knows that police perjury is
commonplace.").
182. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 319 (Brennan, J. dissenting) ("Even while purporting to reaffirm
these constitutional guarantees, the Court has engaged of late in a studied campaign to strip the
Miranda decision piecemeal and to undermine the rights Miranda sought to secure.").
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is admissible. This is not the usual Cardozian ebb and flow- of the common law,
with its inherent ambiguity and change that are the lifeblood of the judicial pro-
cess.' 83 Rather, in many instances the Miranda progeny effectively obfuscate
the operative principles governing the admissibility of confessions.
These post-Miranda rulings make it almost as difficult to determine the ad-
missibility issue today as it was under the due process voluntariness test. Under
that standard, lower court judges weighed and balanced a host of factors to
determine admissibility, without any meaningful guidelines to assure that their
assessments were correct.18 4 That same problem now exists to some extent in
the Miranda context, for while the inferior courts are assured that, by and large,
Miranda lives, they are also advised that its health is impaired in a variety of
open-ended ways that must be taken into account. Reconciliation of these con-
flicting claims is at best problematic and is not unlike the ad hoc decisionmaking
required prior to Miranda, except perhaps in one significant way. In the bad old
days of the ad hoc voluntariness test, at least by the 1960s, Supreme Court re-
views of coerced confession cases more often than not resulted in reversals of
convictions.' 85 Thus, the Court was telling inferior tribunals that if they erred
in determining what process was due, it was preferable to resolve mistakes in
favor of the accused. 186 Now, however, with the Court giving a different set of
signals,' 87 mistakes are more likely to be made in a manner enhancing state
power and constricting constitutional safeguards.
The Court's treatment of Miranda virtually has created a double bind, a
mixed message that adversely affects not only police investigatory methods and
183. See B. CARDOZO, supra note 161, at 25 ("This work of modification [of legal doctrines] is
gradual. It goes on inch by inch. Its effects must be measured by decades and even centuries. Thus
measured, they are seen to have behind them the power and the pressure of the moving glacier.");
accord, Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 190-91 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
184. See Y. Kamisar, A Dissent From the Miranda Dissents, in Y. KAMISAR, supra note 11, at
69-76 (discussing unfair results under the voluntariness test).
185. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 507-08 (Harlan, J., dissenting). After tracing the voluntariness
due process test over the past three decades, Justice Harlan asserted that this standard had been so
refined that it had enabled the Court to develop a "sensitive approach to admissibility of confes-
sions." Id. at 508. He concluded from his survey of the cases that "the overall gauge has been
steadily changing, usually in the direction of restricting admissibility." Id.; see also, Herman, The
Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 733, 754 (1987) ("[I]n a period of thirty years or so [before Miranda], the Supreme Court
granted review in over thirty-five cases in which confessions had been held voluntary. Small wonder
... that the Court reversed the conviction in most of these cases." (footnotes omitted)).
186. Of course, the lower courts often failed to take the hint. See, for example, the discussion of
Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966), in Kamisar, A Dissent From the Miranda Dissents, in
Y. KAMISAR, supra note 11, at 73-76 (discussing the need for a more workable approach and the
Court's response). Indeed, a primary defect of the ambiguous voluntariness test was that it gave
lower courts broad discretion in assessing the totality of circumstances, effectively permitting them
to admit highly questionable confessions-which they often did. See Stone, supra note 98, at 102-03.
187. For example, looking at the statistics concerning the 1981 through 1987 Terms compiled by
the Harvard Law Review in its annual Supreme Court issues, the Court decided 21 self-incrimination
cases in full opinions during this period; 18 of the holdings favored the government. See The
Supreme Court, 1987 Term, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 357-58 (1988); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term,
101 HARv. L. REV. 10, 369-70 (1987); The Supreme Court, 1985 Term, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 310-
1 (1986); The Supreme Court, 1984 Term, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 328-29 (1985); The Supreme Court,
1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 313-14 (1984); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV.
4, 302 (1983); The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 310-11 (1982).
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lower court adjudicatory processes, but also the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court itself. As long as the Court insists that Miranda is viable precedent, it
need not and does not grapple in a meaningful way with the problem of involun-
tary and coerced confessions. Having created a straw remedy against compul-
sion, the Justices apparently feel no obligation to fashion a more efficacious
mechanism for assuring voluntariness. In this sense at least, Miranda does more
harm than good.
If Miranda were not such a convenient backstop, the Court might be more
willing to flesh out due process constraints on police elicitation of statements
from suspects.18 8 As it is, however, the majority seems to have partially col-
lapsed a two-tier system for evaluating the validity of confessions. Miranda is
the upper level, supposedly designed to treat violations of the more sophisticated
prophylactic rules. Due process is the lower level, generally utilized to remedy
more overt police misconduct. Although the two tests are analytically severable,
the Court appears to have merged them to the extent that if the Justices find no
Miranda violation, it follows almost a fortiori that there has been no due process
violation either. The majority's discussion and rejection of the due process con-
tention in Moran v. Burbine, after denying defendant's fifth and sixth amend-
ment claims, suggests that the Court will find due process violations only in
cases of blatant and egregious police misconduct.189 Thus, the Court's mindset
appears to be that if police behavior passes muster under Miranda, it probably
does not violate due process. The difficulty, of course, is that rather than testing
official action under Miranda's original formulation, the Court assesses it under
the modem debilitated version of Miranda, which provides precious little pro-
tection. Had the Court engaged in a vigorous due process analysis, it might have
invalidated the Moran confession,190 and, indeed, even under pre-Miranda tradi-
tional due process scrutiny, it might not have condoned the challenged fraud,
trickery and deceit. 9 1 The Court apparently is able to avoid such a conclusion,
188. See Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 878 (1981) ("Careful
attention to the voluntariness issue remains an imperative, though sometimes overlooked, obligation
of court and counsel .... " (footnote omitted)). The Court itself observed in Miller v. Fenton, 474
U.S. 104 (1985), "Indeed, even after holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination applies in the context of custodial interrogations, . . . the Court has continued to
measure confessions against the requirements of due process." Id. at 110.
189. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432-34 (discussed supra notes 146-50, 169-72 and
accompanying texts).
190. See White, Police Trickery In Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 581 (1979). Argu-
ing for per se rules prohibiting certain interrogation tactics, Professor White asserts:
The Court's disapproval of the police tactics employed in Spano [v. New York, 360 U.S.
315 (1959)] and a number of other cases indicates that in deciding when the police are
"obeying the law," the Court will measure the police conduct against certain basic stan-
dards of fairness that are fundamental to our system ofjustice. Consequently, even reliable
confessions should be inadmissible when they are induced by modes of police trickery that
are inconsistent with basic notions of fairness.
Id. at 584 (footnotes omitted).
191. See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (invalidating confession where police told
defendant that her children would be taken from her custody to persuade her to make statement);
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (rookie officer who was childhood friend of accused feigned
fear of losing job unless defendant cooperated); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1956) (police agreed
to provide physician to sick defendant, then substituted psychiatrist skilled in hypnosis, who induced
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however, by first sustaining the confession pursuant to a soft Miranda analysis,
and then using underdeveloped due process scrutiny to yield the same result. 192
Even when the Court does find a due process violation, the nature of its
inquiry suggests that the governing standard is rather primitive. For example, in
Mincey v. Arizona 193 the Court ruled that defendant's confession was involun-
tary and thus could not be used even for impeachment purposes. 19 4 The circum-
stances surrounding elicitation of the confession were as follows: The defendant,
who was shot, was brought to a hospital intensive care unit; tubes were inserted
into his throat to help him breathe and into his stomach to prevent vomiting,
and a catheter was inserted in his bladder; he had received various drugs and
had an intravenous unit attached to his arm; he could only respond to questions
by writing answers on a sheet of paper, and some of these answers were not
coherent; the defendant repeatedly asked for the interrogation to stop until he
could secure counsel; and the officer continued to question him from 8 p.m. to
midnight.' 95 Notwithstanding these clearly oppressive tactics, the majority
stated that "[t]here were not present in this case some of the gross abuses that
have led the Court in other cases to find the confessions involuntary, such as
beatings.., or 'truth serums.' "196 While the Court did go on to acknowledge
that physical brutality and administration of drugs were not the exclusive bases
for invalidating confessions, 19 7 its extensive recitation of the facts and its labored
conclusions stemming from those facts, indicate that, for defendants seeking to
establish involuntariness, less gruesome scenarios may prove problematic.1 98
In addition to preventing the Court from revitalizing due process as a
means of assuring voluntariness, the continued use of the Miranda system of
warnings enables the Justices to refrain from developing other per se mecha-
nisms to prevent compelled confessions under the fifth amendment privilege. As
for a substitute, it seems clear that the old ad hoc, totality-of-the-circumstances
test for determining voluntariness would be no more suitable today as the pri-
mary means for preventing coercive police interrogation than it was in 1966
confession). The Moran Court, however, implied that police deception consisted of acts of omission
rather than commission. Moran, 475 U.S. at 423-24; id. at 453 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. Even if the pre-Miranda case law fails to establish that the Moran confession was inadmissi-
ble under due process analysis, see supra note 191 and accompanying text, the refinement process
with respect to the voluntariness doctrine that was taking place in the pre-Miranda era might well
have proceeded by now to cover the police deception by omission in Moran. See Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 508 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussed supra note 185). The Miranda decision, however, effec-
tively aborted this evolutionary process. Cf Schulhofer, supra note 188, at 877-78 (noting the im-
pression "that Miranda marked the death of the due process test and that, at least for the time being,
it remains buried" (footnote omitted)). Professor Schulhofer argues that due process is instead very
much alive, and that courts, counsel, and commentators should give further attention to "how that
test ideally should be interpreted." Id. at 877.
193. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
194. Id. at 388, 401-02.
195. Id. at 396-401.
196. Id. at 401 (citations omitted).
197. Id.
198. Cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (holding that to find defendant's state-
ment involuntary there must be police misconduct causally relating to the confession and admitting
the "volunteered" confession of a chronic schizophrenic suffering from auditory hallucinations).
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when the Court decided Miranda.t 99 The amorphous voluntariness standard
provided no meaningful guidelines for either law enforcement officials or the
lower courts, and the Supreme Court's limited review power virtually assured
that confusion would persist.200 Thus, unless we wish to resurrect a test that we
know to be unworkable, a per se remedy appears to be essential. The Miranda
majority itself intimated as much when it said that any alternative procedures
adopted by Congress or the states would have to be "at least as effective [as the
Miranda warnings] in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in
assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it."'20 t
Indeed, the 1986 Report to the Attorney General on Pre-Trial Interrogation,
which was a full-scale attack on both Miranda's philosophy and its holding,202
also criticized the warning system because it precluded "the possibility of devel-
oping and implementing alternatives that would be of greater effectiveness." '20 3
The Report then went on to suggest various interim administrative rules to be
applied pending the overruling of Miranda as an inducement for the Court to do
so.2°4 While these proposals fall far short of what is necessary, 205 their sponsor-
199. See Kamisar, What IsAn "Involuntary" Confession? in Y. KAMISAR, supra note 11, at 1-25.
The old voluntariness test, of course, remains as the due process standard for determining the admis-
sibility or use of confessions in situations in which Miranda is inapplicable, e.g., confessions sought
to be used for impeachment purposes. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See generally
Schulhofer, supra note 188, at 877 (discussing circumstances in which the old due process standard
would be the primary basis for ascertaining admissibility). That such a test may be of value in this
interstitial context does not, however, establish its efficacy as the sole or primary basis for determin-
ing voluntariness in garden variety confession cases.
200. See Schulhofer, supra note 188, at 869-72 (reviewing KASIMAR, supra note 11). Professor
Schulhofer adumbrates the six defects in the due process voluntariness test culled from the works of
Kamisar and others. The primary difficulties were that the term "voluntary" was ambiguous and
failed to focus clearly on the underlying values implicated by coerced confessions; that the elusive
nature of the determination permitted interrogation practice to vary, depending on the type of sus-
pect involved, thus making it difficult to provide meaningful guidelines to the police; that the vague-
ness of the test also left trial and appellate judges without any objective standards; that there were
problems of proof, particularly with respect to psychological coercion; that the standard pitted de-
fendant's credibility against that of the police in an inherently unequal swearing match, which local
judges almost inevitably resolved against the defendant; and that the Court's workload precluded it
from providing effective federal review of confession issues. Id. A proponent of the voluntariness
test has argued, however, that its very amorphousness was its strength, allowing the Court to make
its decisions "without fear of prematurely constitutionalizing interrogation practices." Caplan,
supra note 12, at 1433-34.
201. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. Although the Court made this statement to acknowledge that
the warnings were not the only constitutionally permissible method for protecting the privilege, see
id., the Justices seized upon it in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), as a concession allowing
the Court to deconstitutionalize the warnings and turn them into prophylactic safeguards. Id. at
443-44. If deconstitutionalization is simply a prelude to obliteration then "[tlhose who do not like
Miranda's code-like rules and would strip them from the opinion will be left with the much more
stringent principle that the isolated suspect in custody cannot be questioned at all." Schulhorer,
supra note 19, at 461.
202. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INTERROGATION REPORT, supra note 17, at 39-60, 93-100, The
Report concluded that Miranda "was a decision without a past .... [and] a decision without a
future." Id. at 118.
203. Id. at 99.
204. Id. at 105-07.
205. The Attorney General's Interrogation Report suggested the following possibilities: that,
"where feasible," interrogations be videotaped or recorded; that rules concerning the duration and
frequency of interrogation be established; and that rules be promulgated that would prohibit or
restrict certain deceptive police practices that the Miranda Court viewed as abusive. Id. at 105.
A videotaping or recording requirement is too easily subject to circumvention, permitting ore-
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ship by officials of the Reagan administration amounted to a tacit recognition by
that end of the political spectrum that even the Supreme Court of the 1980s
would not abandon Miranda unless another per se rule was already in place. 20 6
Therefore, the only question is which per se rule or rules?
IV. THE MODEST PROPOSAL
The Miranda decision itself recognized that warnings could be dispensed
with if other equally effective remedies were used 207-remedies as effective as
the Miranda majority apparently expected the warnings to be. The Court has
not advanced any other such per se rules,20 8 and the few state proposals made in
this area,20 9 as well as those of the Justice Department, are either unduly vague
or are easily subject to circumvention. 2 10
Some of the more radical recommendations advanced over the years are
cials to coerce the suspect before capturing an ostensibly voluntary account on film or tape. Even if
recording is continuous, it does not preclude coercion in another room of the stationhouse or else-
where. Moreover, to the extent that such equipment simply becomes part of the furniture whose
presence is forgotten by an interrogator, it does not serve its function as an inhibitor of coercion,
although the result in individual cases may be an inadmissible confession.
Like the Miranda warnings themselves, rules limiting the duration and frequency of questioning
do not take into account idiosyncratic weaknesses of particular suspects and fail to afford sufficient
protection in such cases. Finally, the report seeks to prohibit only those "specific deceptive or ma-
nipulative practices that were characterized as abusive in the Miranda decision." Id. at 102. This
leaves the implication that there are some practices of this sort that would be permissible. Indeed, in
describing the post-Miranda revolution, the report noted, "[We see no reason why a reasonable
effort should not be made to persuade an uncooperative suspect to make a statement or answer
questions." Id. at 113.
Conspicuous by their absence from the recommendations are proposals for police training pro-
grams in interrogation, disciplinary measures against officers found to engage in abusive tactics, and
development of programs designed to provide expertise in investigatory techniques that do not rely
on confessions.
206. The report states:
The courts are now accustomed to setting the rules for custodial interrogations, and to
enforcing the rules that they have created in particular cases. It should be easier for them
to relinquish this role if they know that in doing so they are acceding to a responsible
alternative system, rather than writing a blank check for individual officers or agencies.
Id. at 106.
207. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; see supra note 201 and accompanying text.
208. Even prior to Miranda, however, the Court had established an exclusionary rule for confes-
sions obtained from suspects during periods of illegal detention under its supervisory authority. See
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 451-56 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344-
45 (1943). In addition, as a general rule, under the sixth amendment police officials and their agents
cannot question indicted defendants. See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,205-07 (1964)
(incriminating statements recorded by radio installed in defendant's automobile by government nar-
cotics agents inadmissible at trial on sixth amendment grounds). But see Patterson v. Illinois, 108 S.
Ct. 2389, 2394-96 (1988) (Miranda warnings given to indicted defendant in custody who was not yet
represented by counsel sufficient to apprise him of sixth amendment rights); Kuhlmann v. Wilson,
477 U.S. 436, 456-61 (1986) (holding admissible indicted defendant's incriminating statement made
to informant who was placed in his cell but did not initiate conversation about crime).
209. See, e.g., Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985) (analysis of Alaska Supreme Court
rule requiring recording of interrogation conducted in detention as a means of implementing due
process under state law); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.22, § l(c) (Vernon 1989) (requiring
corroboration of oral confessions either by evidence found as a result thereof or by videotaping). A
few states have adopted versions of the McNabb-Mallory rule, discussed supra note 208. See, e.g.,
State v. Benbo, 174 Mont. 252, 261-62, 570 P.2d 894, 899-900 (1977); Commonwealth v. Davenport,
471 Pa. 278, 284, 370 A.2d 301, 306 (1977).
210. See supra note 205 (critique of the Justice Department suggestions). To the extent that
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meritorious. For example, having an attorney present at custodial interrogation
certainly helps assure that any resulting confession will be a product of the de-
fendant's free will.2 11 The presence of counsel is often considered an ironclad
guarantee against police elicitation of any confession, voluntary or coerced. 212
Yet, like other warranties, it is only as good as its maker. To put not too fine a
point on the matter, the question of ineffective assistance of counsel, even in the
interrogation context, cannot be easily dismissed.2 13 While it may be true that
state proposals overlap with those of the Justice Department-such as videotaping of interroga-
tion-they are, of course, subject to the same criticisms.
While state incorporation of the McNabb-Mallory rule, see supra note 209, would prevent many
police abuses, it, too, is subject to manipulation. For instance, what constitutes an "unnecessary"
delay in bringing the suspect before a magistrate? Where the statute in effect sets a time limit for
presenting the defendant to the magistrate, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1982) (six hours), custody
during this time period necessarily takes its toll. In addition, statutes of this sort often permit the
authorities to establish that delay beyond the specified time was reasonable. Id. Moreover, such
proposals presume that the magistrate's warnings would be sufficient to dissipate any coercive ef-
fects, even though the defendant would be returned to police custody. Finally, even if defendant
asserted her rights, the Court still would face questions of whether the police had honored defend-
ant's invocation. See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S.
96 (1975).
211. According to Professor Ogletree,
A new bright-line procedural rule is needed to preserve the constitutional values the
Miranda Court sought to protect. All suspects in custody should have a nonwaivable right
to consult with a lawyer before being interrogated by the police. Any statements obtained
by police before a suspect consults her attorney would automatically be inadmissible as
evidence.
Ogletree, supra note 13, at 1842; see 0. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF
GUILT 205 (1973); Leiken, supra note 108, at 49-51.
212. The Attorney General's Interrogation Report stated:
[A]ny value of a right to counsel in establishing voluntariness must be weighed against the
costs of recognizing such a right. These costs are substantial and obvious. If a lawyer
appears, he will usually tell his client to say nothing to law enforcement officers, and there
will be little point in attempting further questioning. Even if questioning does subsequently
take place, prior consultation with counsel and the delay associated with it eliminates the
possibility of obtaining an untainted story and increases the likelihood of successful
fabrication.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INTERROGATION REPORT, supra note 17, at 111; see Inbau & Manak, Mi-
randa v. Arizona-Is It Worth the Cost?, 21 THE PROSECUTOR 31, 35 (No. 4 1988) ("Once a lawyer
enters upon an interrogation scene, he will very rarely do anything more than instruct his client to
keep his mouth shut.").
213. Presumably, although distinctions can be drawn between performance in the courtroom
and in the interrogation room, there is little reason to believe that attorneys who do poorly in the
former will do substantially better in the latter. Unfortunately, in the courtroom context there is
ample evidence that many lawyers provide inadequate representation. See, e.g., Bazelon, The Defec-
tive Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973) ("What I have seen in 23 years on the
bench leads me to believe that a great many if not most indigent defendants do not receive the
effective assistance of counsel guaranteed them by the 6th Amendment .. "); Weaver, Bar to Con-
front Burger Over His Criticism, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1978, at 1, col. 3 (American Bar Association
President disputed Chief Justice Burger's assertion that half of American lawyers were unqualified
for courtroom work and estimated instead that "only about 20 percent of current lawyers were not
qualified for such service"). These circumstances notwithstanding, the Court ruled in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), that to establish ineffective assistance it is necessary to show that
(1) counsel's error was so serious that it establishes that the attorney "was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment" and that (2) the "errors were so seri-
ous as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id. at 687. The
Strickland opinion also refers continually to the deference that reviewing courts must show to coun-
sel's performance and the dangers of second-guessing an attorney's strategic decisions. Id. at 689-91.
The end result is that while incompetence may be widespread, judicial relief for it is not.
Moreover, it is unlikely that an attorney's erroneous advice to a client under interrogation (such
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"any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect . . . to make no statement to
police under any circumstances,"214 the problem is that some lawyers are not.
Indeed, given the stress and time pressures of stationhouse questioning, mistakes
in judgment, such as erroneous advice to give an exonerating statement, are
more likely to occur.21 5 Affording the right to counsel also would not obviate
inquiries with respect to waiver once counsel has left the stationhouse. Thus,
such a proposal, while extremely helpful, does not assure that only voluntary
confessions will be used at trial. It also does not eliminate litigation of issues,
such as ineffective assistance of counsel, that may be peripheral to the question
of coercion.
Similarly, proposals requiring police to bring suspects before magistrates
without unnecessary delay and to advise them of their constitutional rights help
encourage voluntariness, but do not guarantee it.2 16 Coercive tactics still can
take place prior to presentation of the suspect to the magistrate. Moreover, this
temporary respite from exclusive police custody ends when the suspect leaves
the courtroom. Even if the defendant asserted his rights, the court still would
face the question whether the police had honored defendant's invocation. In-
deed, should the Court deem confessions admissible only when made to magis-
trates, 2 17 voluntariness still would not be assured. In this context as well, the
accused is in custody and in the presence of an authority who may appear to be
soliciting if not demanding an admission of one sort or another.
In short, neither defense attorneys nor magistrates can assure the voluntari-
ness of confessions. Whether suspects render self-inculpatory statements in the
stationhouse, the courtroom, or any other custodial context, the circumstances
surrounding their elicitation are so intimidating that the exercise of free will is at
best problematic. 218 The voluntariness of admissions in such cases always will
as a mistaken suggestion to give an exculpatory statement that turns out otherwise) can be attacked
if it is based on information furnished by the client, see id. at 691, and in the stressful atmosphere
and time constraints of police interrogation, a defendant is more likely to be less than candid to a
newly appointed attorney. Furthermore, assuming that there is a right to effective assistance of coun-
sel in the interrogation context at all, see Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982) (per curiam) (in
circumstances in which there is no federal constitutional right to counsel, such as discretionary state
appeals, there is also no right to effective assistance of counsel), it is nonetheless unclear whether a
confession obtained as a result of incompetent legal advice, if otherwise reliable, is subject to attack
on sixth amendment grounds. Cf. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 391 (1986) (Powell, J.
concurring in the judgment) ("The more difficult question is whether the admission of illegally seized
but reliable evidence can ever constitute 'prejudice' under Strickland. There is a strong argument
that it cannot.").
214. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in part).
215. See supra note 213.
216. See supra note 210.
217. Similarly, Professor Dripps urges a per se exclusionary rule with respect to statements ob-
tained through police questioning, conditioned on disincorporation of the fifth amendment privilege
and authorization of compulsory magisterial interrogation. Dripps, supra note 18, at 701-02. Pro-
fessor Dripps' proposal is based on the assumption that society is unwilling to forgo valuable evi-
dence and that the concept of voluntariness is subordinated to that overriding principle. He views
his recommendation as a means of accommodating this societal need without acceding to either
police brutality or repeal of the fifth amendment. See id.
218. See infra notes 235-41 and accompanying text (discussing the intimidating nature of cus-
tody).
Even though pleas of guilty often suffer from similar infirmities such as ineffective counsel ad-
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be debatable. Thus, to the extent that these proposals are meant to curb im-
proper police questioning, they seem to finesse the real issue-whether any con-
fession given by a suspect while in custody can be considered either voluntary
within the meaning of due process or noncompelled under the fifth amendment.
Our answers to those questions are maybe and no. The confession may or may
not be voluntary, depending on various factors including the quality and quan-
tity of police pressure, but it is, in any event, compelled. The fifth amendment
prohibition against compulsion provides a separate and independent basis for
assessing the admissibility of confessions, 2 19 one that goes beyond preclusion of
unreliable statements and of unlawful police overreaching, manipulation, decep-
tion and the like, all of which are prohibited under the voluntariness standard of
the due process clause-at least if the misconduct is sufficiently egregious. 220
Professor Schulhofer has argued that the self-incrimination clause covers "more
civilized but nonetheless compelling pressures. ' '221 While accepting his view
that less blatant official pressure violates the self-incrimination privilege, one
may also, at the same time, see compulsion as primarily situational in nature, at
least if there is government involvement in creating the situation. Such a situa-
tional concept of compulsion would allow the courts to reject confessions when
individuals are, as a result of state-created circumstances (such as being in cus-
tody), not fully able to exercise free will in determining whether to assist the
state in securing their own convictions.
vising frightened and uncomprehending defendants, see Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in
Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1278-1313 (1975), we are not suggesting the abolition of such
convictions without trial in this Article. Pleas are distinguishable, since they are generally rendered
at a later stage of the proceeding, after counsel has had the opportunity to prepare the case ade-
quately and to make a more accurate assessment of the probability of conviction and length of
sentence.
219. See Schulhofer, supra note 19, at 440-46. Professor Schulhofer urges that "compulsion for
self-incrimination purposes and involuntariness for due process purposes cannot mean the same
thing." Id. at 443. Professor Grano has attacked both this distinction between the concepts of
compulsion and voluntariness and the conclusion that statements can be compelled even if no pres-
sure has been exerted on the defendant. His attack asserted that Professor Schulhofer's failure to
criticize Miranda's limitation to custodial interrogation is an implicit concession that compulsion,
like voluntariness, is concerned with degrees of pressure. See Grano, supra note 18, at 182-87. Since
Professor Schulhofer insisted that custodial interrogation without the Miranda warnings neverthe-
less would yield a compelled statement in violation of the fifth amendment, Professor Grano con-
tended that "this implausible view, taken seriously, ultimately would require the abolition of police
interrogation, in that Miranda's procedural litany cannot eliminate the mild pressure of which he
complains." Id. at 186. Inasmuch as we view custody in and of itself as inherently coercive and thus
go beyond even "this implausible view," our proposal would not permit the use of any statements
made during custody, no matter whether the result of interrogation. See infra notes 235-42 and
accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Moran, 475 U.S. at 432 ("We do not question that on facts more egregious than
those presented here police deception might rise to a level of a due process violation.").
221. Schulhofer, supra note 19, at 444. Professor Schulhofer uses the law of waiver as a para-
digm for distinguishing between involuntariness under the due process clause and compulsion under
the fifth amendment. He posits the example of a witness freely choosing to testify at trial, thereby
waiving the prohibition against compulsion but not the prohibition against involuntariness. Thus,
the state may compel such a witness to undergo cross-examination during reasonable business hours
in the presence of defense counsel, but cannot subject the witness to 36 hours of continuous interro-
gation by relays of attorneys. But see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169-70 (1986) ("There is
obviously no reason to require more in the way of a 'voluntariness' inquiry in the Miranda waiver
context than in the Fourteenth Amendment confession context"); Moran, 475 U.S. at 432 (quoted at
supra note 220).
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This situational concept of compulsion is not inconsistent with the Court's
decision in Colorado v, Connelly,222 in which defendant, a schizophrenic suffer-
ing from auditory hallucinations, came sua sponte to the police station, volun-
teered the information that he had killed someone, and asked to discuss the
matter.223 The Connelly Court rejected a free will rationale and required that
government coercion be present to establish involuntariness or to invalidate a
waiver of the fifth amendment privilege. The Court's rejection of free will as a
necessary ingredient of waiver in Connelly may have stemmed in part from the
circumstances of that case. The police presence was, in a sense, incidental to the
confession; the state had not created an atmosphere that compelled the defend-
ant to speak; whatever compulsion he felt came from his tormented mind. The
situational view of compulsion is at least one step removed from Connelly in that
the police, by arresting the suspect and placing him in custody, have created an
atmosphere that is inherently coercive. In that sense there is a causal connection
between official action and the ensuing confession.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Carter v. Kentucky224 that even in the ab-
sence of prosecutorial comment, a trial court must instruct the jury not to draw
adverse inferences from defendant's failure to testify225 offers support for the
situational definition of compulsion. Professor Schulhofer thought Carter was
evidence that, rather than being merely formal and legal, " 'compulsion' also
arises from the state's failure to take reasonable steps to eliminate pressure that
is wholly informal and psychological. ' 226 We agree, but also think that Carter
is an example of situational compulsion. The state simply has put the defendant
on trial, which it has a right to do. No one is explicitly asking the accused to
testify or otherwise assist the prosecution; yet the state-created circumstances
are "instinct with obligation" and pressure. The remedy of curative instructions
indicates that the fifth amendment requires a mechanism for dissipating even
such forms of compulsion.
The Bill of Rights incorporation process also lends credence to this concept
of situational compulsion. Due process can be seen as a baseline, a lowest com-
mon denominator for determining constitutionally permissible governmental be-
havior.227 The criminal safeguards of the Bill of Rights, on the other hand, have
222. 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (discussed supra note 198).
223. Id. at 167-71.
224. 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
225. Id. at 303.
226. Schulhofer, supra note 19, at 439. In this connection, Professor Schulhofer also relied on a
line of cases holding that the state may not fire employees who refuse to waive their fifth amendment
privileges. This line of cases included Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 431 U.S. 801 (1977), in which the
Court specifically noted that economic coercion by the government was relevant in determining what
constituted compulsion. See Schulhofer, supra note 19, at 439.
227. One example is Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), a preincorporation case holding
that police conduct that "shocks the conscience" violates due process. Id. at 172 (police forcibly
pumped defendant's stomach for evidence to be used against him). Justice Black's concurrence as-
serted that the fifth amendment was the appropriate focus for the Court's decision and that "faithful
adherence to the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights insures a more permanent protection of
individual liberty than that which can be afforded by the nebulous [due process] standards stated by
the majority." Id. at 175 (Black, J., concurring).
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their own individual and particular values. 228 The entire painstaking process of
incorporation assured that these concerns also would be relevant in assessing
alleged state misconduct. Indeed, the Court has acknowledged that the assimi-
lated provisions embody distinctive values by separately addressing particular
Bill of Rights guarantees, on the one hand, and due process-fundamental fair-
ness questions on the other.229 Thus, it seems unlikely that the long struggle
228. Reduced to its barest minimum, due process would require that the defendant receive no-
tice of the charges and a hearing thereon, for without these baseline safeguards, government action
may be totally arbitrary and unreliable. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1898). Clearly, the
Bill of Rights goes considerably further. For example, when the Court originally held that due
process included a right to counsel in capital cases, its rationale was tied to the due process right of
notice and hearing. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (reasoning that the right to
a hearing would be illusory "if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel"). The
incorporated right to counsel articulated in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), however,
stems from the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel, whose contours are substantially
broader, including, for example, the automatic right to an attorney in all felonies and in those misde-
meanors for which the defendant is actually confined. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
Where the sixth amendment is not applicable, as, for example, in probation and parole revocation
proceedings, the right to counsel based on due process alone is far more circumscribed and is deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
The depth as well as the breadth of the guarantee may depend on whether it is protected merely
by due process or is specifically incorporated. For instance, when the right to counsel was only an
aspect of due process fundamental fairness, the standard for establishing ineffective assistance of
counsel was extremely stringent, namely, that the trial was a farce and mockery. Following incorpo-
ration of the right, however, courts took the position that ineffective assistance could be established
under the lesser standard of lack of reasonably competent representation. See, e.g., United States v.
DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The Court thereafter held that the standard for
ineffective assistance is deficient performance that prejudices the defense. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
229. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), in which the Court upheld the
taking of a blood sample from an injured person by a doctor at the direction of police and affirmed
defendant's conviction for driving while intoxicated, based in part on the blood sample. In the
course of its opinion, the Court separately addressed the fourth and fifth amendment as well as the
due process issues. Although the Court rejected each of these constitutional claims, it did so by
looking to the particular concerns of each constitutional guarantee. Thus, the Supreme Court di-
rected its fourth amendment inquiry to the probable cause and warrant requirements of that safe-
guard and its fifth amendment discussion concerned the meaning of the phrase "compelled to
testify" in the amendment. On the other hand, the Court decided the due process claim by asking
whether the state conduct offended the sense ofjustice required under Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952) (discussed supra note 227); see supra note 228 (discussion of the Court's separate treat-
ment of due process and sixth amendment claims); see also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)
(the Court individually addressed defendant's fifth and sixth amendment and due process claims)
(discussed supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text).
The Court requires a showing of egregious police misconduct to establish a due process viola-
tion. See, e.g., Moran, 475 U.S. at 433-34 ("On these facts, the challenged conduct falls short of the
kind of misbehavior that so shocks the sensibilities of civilized society" as to deprive defendant of the
fundamental fairness required by due process.). It is thus more likely the courts will find that a
particular government action violates a specific Bill of Rights guarantee rather than due process. It
also may be that alleged official misconduct violates neither due process nor the strictures of a spe-
cific guarantee. In addition, due process and a particular safeguard may provide almost coterminous
protection, because the implicated values of each are similar. See Whitely v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312
(1986) (holding that prison authorities who shot inmate during the course of efforts to subdue a
prison riot did not violate either the inmate's eighth amendment or due process rights). In Whitely
the Court observed,
It would indeed be surprising if, in the context of forceful prison security measures, "con-
duct that shocks the conscience" [and, therefore, violates due process] .... were not also
punishment "inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency".., in violation of the
Eighth .... In these circumstances the Due Process Clause affords respondent no greater
protection than does the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.
Id. at 327 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) and Estelle v. Gamble, 429
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culminating in incorporation of the fifth amendment prohibition against com-
pelled testimony could have been simply an heroic effort to provide an official
synonym for involuntariness. Nor was incorporation likely intended only to
cover slightly less egregious police misconduct than that already prohibited
under the due process clause. Due process was and is an evolving concept, the
scope of which has been broadened substantially over the decades to bring
within its ambit progressively less blatant forms of official misbehavior.230
Rather, it seems more probable that application of the fifth amendment privilege
was meant to deal with something other than or in addition to active forms of
police misconduct.
Just as the voluntariness concept has evolved, moving gradually from the
prohibition against physical brutality and concern with reliability announced in
Brown v. Mississippi23 1 to the prohibition against deception and concern with
police misconduct declared in Spano v. New York, 232 the compulsion doctrine is
likewise susceptible of growth. The Court may have intended Miranda to be the
equivalent of Brown v. Mississippi233 in this evolutionary process. Thus, Mi-
randa required the conjunction of interrogation and custody as its baseline es-
tablishing compulsion. In time, had the Court permitted Miranda to be true to
its teaching, the subsequent case law might have produced a more refined defini-
tion of compulsion and a more refined mechanism for its dissipation-from a
system of warnings to a total bar against statements made in all circumstances
viewed as compulsive. Thus, the Court might have viewed either custody or
interrogation standing alone as sufficient to establish compulsion, and it might
have reached even beyond to other circumstances that compel persons to incrim-
inate themselves. 234
We would not go so far, at least at this time. It is our view, however, that
suspects who are in custody cannot make truly voluntary or noncompelled con-
fessions and that, therefore, any statements made by them, whether to police or
to police agents, 235 and whether the product of interrogation, should be inad-
U.S. 97, 103 (1976)); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding Bail Reform
Act authorization of pretrial detention against successive substantive due process and eighth amend-
ment excessive bail challenges). But see Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 358 (1986) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) ("The Due Process Clause provides broader protection than does the Eighth
Amendment.").
230. For instance, in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), the Court refused to hold the
fifth amendment applicable to the states, and therefore affirmed defendant's conviction for first-
degree murder obtained on retrial after the state had appealed his initial conviction for murder in the
second-degree. The Justices' due process inquiry was whether this form of double jeopardy created
"a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it." Id. at 328. Their answer was
no. By 1969, however, the Court stated: "The validity of petitioner's larceny conviction must be
judged, not by the watered-down standards enunciated in Palko, but under this Court's interpreta-
tions of the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy provision." Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796
(1969). The Court then went on to reverse a conviction and sentence on facts far less egregious than
in Palko: the defendant was acquitted of larceny and convicted of burglary; he was retried and
convicted on both counts, receiving a concurrent sentence on the larceny charge. Id. at 785-86.
231. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
232. 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (discussed supra note 191).
233. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
234. See infra notes 247-52 and accompanying text.
235. The sixth amendment prohibits the use of confessions obtained from indicted defendants by
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missible in evidence. We do recognize that everyone ultimately has free
choice--of sorts. As the saying goes, even the condemned person awaiting exe-
cution can opt either to curse the hangman or pray to God.2 36 Admittedly, in
the mundane, everyday world, there are also constraints on the exercise of free
will that are simply endemic to the human condition- everyone's decisions are
influenced by unconscious desires, time pressures, economic demands, cost-ben-
efit analyses, and the like. 237 In a very real sense, however, custody presents a
difference in kind. Its circumstances are sui generis. The suspect is stripped of
power, control, and dignity, and is subject, by and large, to the whims of jail-
ers.2 38 If a purpose of the privilege is to create a parity of sorts between the
individual and the state, it must be recognized that, in the confines of the sta-
tionhouse or its functional equivalent, there is no equality, gross or otherwise.
Although Miranda focused on the inherent coerciveness of custodial inter-
rogation, it is custody in and of itself that is coercive. Concededly, official inter-
rogation heightens the tension, but even without questioning, custody tends to
deprive persons of free choice.23 9 The lack of freedom simpliciter, therefore,
requires a broader prophylactic rule than that set forth in Miranda. Given the
nature of custody, advising suspects of their rights is unlikely to dissipate its
oppressive effects, 24° and waivers in such situations cannot be viewed realisti-
cally as noncompelled. Moreover, the case law interpreting the interrogation
surreptitious police agents. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201 (1964). Under the proposal set forth in this Article, this prohibition also would be
applicable under the fifth amendment to unindicted defendants in custody. Kuhlmann v. Wilson,
477 U.S. 436 (1986), however, permits the admission of confessions made to government informants
placed in an indicted defendant's cell if the informant is acting merely as a "listening post." Id. at
456 n.19. Under our proposal such confessions would be inadmissible because of their custodial
context.
236. A. WHEELis, How PEOPLE CHANGE 115-16 (1973) ("With the noose around our necks
there still are options-to curse God or to pray, to weep or to slap the executioner in the face.").
237. Professor Dripps similarly states:
The vast majority of confessions do not result from the suspect's "free will and rational
intellect" any more than they result from old-fashioned and brutal third-degree tactics.
Instead, the bulk of confessions results from irrationality, mistake, and manipulation. Any
expectation that truly voluntary confessions are available on a systemic basis depends
either on insupportable factual assumptions or on an interpretation of voluntariness that
reduces that word to signifying no more than the absence of third-degree methods.
Dripps, supra note 18, at 700.
238. Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (pretrial detainees have diminished expectation of
privacy and therefore strip searches and body cavity inspections are not unreasonable); T. WOLFE,
THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES 579 (1987) ("A liberal is a conservative who has been arrested.").
239. See Schulhofer, supra note 19, at 447-48.
240. By its nature, custody is intimidating, and the resulting fear and loss of control often effec-
tively prevent suspects from understanding or even hearing warnings concerning their rights and the
waiver thereof. See Olgetree, supra note 13, at 1827-29; see also Autry v. Estelle, 706 F.2d 1394,
1404 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Of course custody itself has an inherently coercive dimension."), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1085 (1984); People v. Smith, 34 Cal. 3d 251, 268-69, 667 P.2d 149, 159, 193 Cal. Rptr.
692, 702 (1983) ("It is the fact of custody with its inherent coercive ambience inducing a psychologi-
cal compulsion to confess that underlies... the court's rule on continued police interrogation .... ").
Indeed the Supreme Court implicitly recognized the inherent coerciveness of custody in Innis, 446
U.S. at 300 (" 'Interrogation' .... must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that
inherent in custody itself."). See generally Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion,
82 HARv. L. REV. 42, 46 (1968) (discussing such factors as the "ambiguity and unpredictability of
the setting," the "threat implied therein," and the consequent effect on confessions).
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requirement suggests that drawing the line of protection at this point invites
circumvention of the privilege. The police apparently have become adept at cre-
ating circumstances short of interrogation that nonetheless effectively compel a
suspect to make ostensibly spontaneous utterances. 24 1
There may of course be certain special persons of steel will who can insulate
themselves from the effects of custody and who, for various reasons, are able to
reach a dispassionate and unfettered decision to confess. The problem is that
there are few such individuals and it is extremely difficult to determine who they
are.242 It simply does not make sense to expend the resources necessary to make
such a finding, assuming an inquiry along these lines could be fruitful at all.
243
Just as Miranda established its per se warning rules even though the effect would
be to exclude some confessions that would be deemed voluntary under the tradi-
tional due process test, this proposal would prohibit admission of all custodial
statements even though a few may have been the products of free will, at least as
defined here.
Drawing the line at custody does deny protection in the atypical case of a
confession by a previously unsuspected person who voluntarily appears at the
police station, either with or without an attorney. Because this is not a state-
initiated appearance, custody has not attached and under our proposal such a
defendant's confession is presumptively voluntary. In the more typical case,
however, the police arrest a suspect or the suspect surrenders, with or without
counsel, in response to a warrant or other coercive mechanism and custody at-
taches. Under the proposal advanced in this Article the statement of such an
individual would be excluded. It may appear anomalous to make the confession
of the nonvolunteer suspect inadmissible even when he is accompanied by coun-
sel, while at the same time presumptively admitting the statement of a previ-
ously unsuspected person who voluntarily appears at the stationhouse even if she
is without an attorney.244 The latter individuals, however, have had the oppor-
tunity while free of state coercion to make an unfettered decision to give them-
selves over to the police. The choice to do so, with or without the advice of an
attorney, was theirs. Concededly, ignorance, fear and economic constraints may
act as deterrents to seeking counsel prior to a voluntary appearance, and thus
the choice may not be completely free. For now, however, because such cases
are rare and because the state has not created any compulsive context impinging
on decisions of this sort, it seems appropriate not to view these statements as
241. See Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 294-95 (discussed supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text).
242. Cf. S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY 5 (1974) (finding that a "substantial propor-
tion" of subjects inflicted what they thought were painful shocks to another person because they had
agreed to participate in an experiment and were yielding to the authority of the person directing the
project).
243. Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) ("procedural due process rules are
shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as applied to the generality of cases,
not the rare exceptions").
244. This is not to signal agreement with the Court's decision in Colorado v. Connelly. See supra
notes 198, 222-25, and infra notes 248-50 and accompanying texts (discussing Connelly). Free will
surely should be deemed an underlying requirement for voluntariness, and it is entirely unclear how
an insane person can effect a valid waiver.
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compelled under the fifth amendment. 245
This Article also does not advocate the arguably more radical position that
all statements made by suspects to state officials or their agents during interroga-
tion be inadmissible in evidence. As the Miranda majority acknowledged, cus-
tody is an appropriate dividing line, although that term should be defined in a
considerably less grudging manner than the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
have.246 At the same time, there is much merit in this more protective view,
because the line between custodial and noncustodial interrogation may prove
inadequate to deal with police questioning in noncustodial contexts, such as os-
tensibly nonthreatening but nonetheless inherently intimidating interrogation in
the suspect's home.247 Indeed, if it became clear that our proposal was subject
to circumvention through such techniques, we would not hesitate to propose a
broader prophylactic rule.
A still more extreme position would prohibit even volunteered statements
made outside custody without preceding interrogation. While we do not advo-
cate it, there is merit to this position. We are simply uncertain whether any
statements to government officials can be deemed noncompelled. In the previ-
ously discussed circumstances, where the focus is on whether the defendant is in
custody or is being interrogated, it is official action or governmentally-created
context that impinges on the exercise of free will. That is not the case with re-
spect to volunteered noncustodial statements made in the absence of interroga-
tion when extraneous forces may reduce the actor's ability to choose freely
whether to incriminate herself. The demarcation based on state causation, how-
ever, may not be that critical. The more appropriate question may be simply
whether the resulting confession is freely given or compelled. The issue raised is
analogous to that presented in Colorado v. Connelly,248 in which the Court held
that, notwithstanding Miranda and the due process clause, the volunteered
statement of a concededly psychotic person was admissible evidence because
there was no "police conduct causally related to the confession. ' 249 For the
dissent, however, official misconduct was irrelevant in determining whether de-
fendant's admission was an act of free will, since "due process derives much of
its meaning from a conception of fundamental fairness that emphasizes the right
to make vital choices voluntarily. '250
Indeed, there is an even more drastic proposal that could be made-
245. Under our proposal, however, if defendant is thereafter held by the police, custody has
attached and any statements made subsequently would be viewed as compelled. Moreover, even
prior to that point, if police exert pressure on the suspect, the resulting statement likewise would be
excluded.
246. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
247. See Grano, supra note 18, at 186 n.68. Even Professor Grano, who rejects the view that
custodial interrogation is inherently coercive, notes that "[a]s a factual matter, many non-custodial
interrogations exceed in pressure many custodial ones." Id.
Of course, even our present proposal excludes a statement such as the one described in the text
if the circumstances constituted custody.
248. 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (discussed supra notes 198, 222-23 & 244 and accompanying texts).
249. Id. at 164.
250. Id. at 176 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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namely, that all confessions, whether voluntary or compelled, reliable or sponta-
neous, and whether made in custody, in court, or to government officials, be
deemed inadmissible in evidence in criminal proceedings-that is, that confes-
sions be considered of no evidentiary value. We have a philosophical predilec-
tion for such a position,25 1 which reflects the ancient Talmudic rule.252 We
recognize, however, that this position may be considered in tension with the fifth
amendment prohibition, which is directed solely to compelled self-incriminating
testimony.253
Viewed in contrast to the foregoing alternatives, our proposition has much
to recommend it, but is not such a sharp departure from the original under-
standing of Miranda. The proposal would not preclude admissibility of volun-
tary statements made in noncustodial situations, whether elicited or sua sponte,
although we would define custody broadly. This compromise, however, at least
would prevent the most abusive forms of police misconduct, for it is custody that
permits the police to play havoc with the defendant's free will, and it is custody
that invites the sort of official trickery effectively condoned by the Court in Mo-
ran v. Burbine.2 54 At the same time, the proposal would respect the individual's
decision to make incriminating statements in the noncustodial context. Further-
more, by generally precluding reliance on confessions, it would provide an in-
centive for improved police investigation. The proposal surely would discourage
placement of suspects in custody absent sufficient evidence of guilt. 255 It also
would provide a brighter line to guide police, prosecutors, and judges with re-
spect to the admissibility of confessions, and it would eliminate the need to liti-
251. See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, In The Beginning: The Talmudic Rule Against Self-Incrimi-
nation, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 955, 1048 (1988) ("The Talmudic rule [prohibiting the use of confessions
in criminal cases] is simple; it is absolute; it is profound. We could do worse than to look to it for
guidance.").
252. See A. KIRSCHENBAUM, SELF-INCRIMINATION IN JEWISH LAW 17 (1970) (According to
the Talmudic rule, "Not only may a man not be compelled to be a witness against himself, but even
were he voluntarily to testify against himself and confess wholly or partially to a crime, his testimony
is rejected completely and has no status in court.").
253. But see Glaser, A New/Old Look at the Fifth Amendment-Some Help from the Past, 1
JEWISH L. Assoc. STUDIES 29, 38 (1985) (suggesting that the term "compelled" in the fifth amend-
ment may be interpreted to preclude an admission of guilt).
254. 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (discussed supra notes 146-50, 169-72 and accompanying texts).
255. While Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (holding that confession obtained from
defendant arrested without probable cause is inadmissible unless purged of taint of illegal arrest),
would generally preclude the use of confessions taken from defendants arrested without probable
cause, it would not apply to situations in which there is probable cause but arguably insufficient
evidence to convict. Our proposal would tend to encourage, but not require, the police to delay
arrest until they had sufficient evidence to convict, either in the form of extrinsic proof or an un-
coerced confession obtained from the accused while not in custody. Such police restraint should be
encouraged. For example, in Japan police hold approximately 100,000 people in pretrial detention
cells each year. Chira, Tokyo Journal-Secrets of Police Cell: Woman's Grim Story, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 20, 1988, at A4, col. 3. Critics argue that police use this detention system to coerce confes-
sions, a process facilitated by a prohibition against the presence of lawyers during interrogation. Id.
Opponents of a bill to continue this system contend that police investigations rely on confessions,
and that, as a result, police arrest suspects on insufficient proof, with arrest marking the commence-
ment rather than the conclusion of the investigative process. Id. Compare the Japanese system with
the following commentary on Moran: "By emphasizing the state's substantial interest in incommu-
nicado custodial interrogation and failing to condemn official deception, the opinion suggests that,
absent egregious misconduct, the police can isolate a suspect and deny an attorney all access."
Harvard-1985 Term, supra note 149, at 134.
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gate collateral issues other than the question of custody. Moreover, the proposal
allows the Court to create a parity of sorts between indicted and unindicted
defendants with respect to custodial confessions, without extending the sixth
amendment right to counsel to the latter category of suspects, a step that the
Court refuses to take.25 6 Finally, in comparison to the proposals requiring ap-
pearance before a magistrate or the presence of counsel during interrogation,
this recommendation gives greater expression to a core value of the fifth amend-
ment, namely, the protection of human dignity. To allow the state to prove a
person's guilt based on a confession made in a government-created situation that
by its very nature psychologically induces people to disclose incriminating infor-
mation, denigrates the concept of man as separate and apart from the state and
entitled to the exercise of free will.
Stated another way, this alternative does no more than go beyond Miranda
by substituting for its warning and waiver system a per se rule of inadmissibility
that extends to ostensibly volunteered statements made in custody. In short,
this is a modest but helpful proposal.
V. CONCLUSION
This proposal to eliminate the use of custodial confessions is not a Swiftian
gesture. It is only the nature of the contemporary national debate concerning
Miranda that may make it appear so. In the criminal law area at least, jurispru-
dence seems to be backing into the future. It is disheartening that, at this late
date, serious scholars still contend that the appropriate means for resolution of
the tension between state security and individual dignity is disincorporation of
the fifth amendment to allow interrogation of suspects by magistrates, 2 57 or a
return to a variant of the ad hoc, totality-of-the-circumstances test for determin-
ing the voluntariness of confessions. 2 58 The former turns the accusatorial sys-
tem on its head, even though it is designed to prevent de facto inquisitorial
examinations by the police. The latter is a time-tested prescription for failure.
While we do not denigrate government's need to deal effectively with criminal
conduct, there is scant evidence that Miranda is either an impediment to effec-
tive law enforcement or, more specifically, a significant obstacle to conviction.25 9
256. Granting suspects the unwaivable right to consult with counsel prior to custodial interroga-
tion, however, does not necessarily require extension of the sixth amendment right to counsel to this
stage of the proceedings. Such a right could instead be based, as Miranda is, on a limited right to
counsel to protect fifth amendment interests.
257. See Dripps, supra note 18, at 701-02 (described supra notes 18 and 217). Professor Dripps'
proposal is not the first in this vein. See, e.g., Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused-A
Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224 (1932); see also Kamisar, Kauper's "Judicial
Examination of the Accused" Forty Years Later-Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, in Y.
KAMISAR, supra note 11, at 77-94 (discussing the relative merits of the Kauper and Miranda models,
including revisions of the Kauper proposal by Judges Friendly and Schaefer).
258. See Caplan, supra note 12, at 1473-76 (discussing alternatives to Miranda); see also supra
notes 199-200 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of the voluntariness standard),
259. Although the Attorney General's Interrogation Report stated that "before-and-after studies
... indicateo that the implementation of Miranda's system had a major adverse effect on the willing-
ness of suspects to respond to police questions," ATrORNEY GENERAL'S PRETRIAL INVESTIGATION
REPORT, supra note 17, at 57, it seems reasonably clear that "[t]he great weight of empirical evi-
dence supports the conclusion that Miranda's impact on the police's ability to obtain confessions has
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Even so, Miranda apparently has become a scapegoat for all the intractable
criminal law problems facing this country. Crime abounds, and we do not know
what to do about it. Why people commit crimes, how to stop them, how to
sentence them, and how to control the scourge of drugs are all unanswered ques-
tions. On a gut level at least, the problem of crime appears insoluble. Yet the
public demands action. In the absence of meaningful solutions, critics seem to
say, let us be rid of legal technicalities such as exclusionary rules that ostensibly
allow criminals to evade justice. Let Miranda, not crack, serve as public enemy
number one. Better still, tie them together causally. There is more crack be-
cause of Miranda; therefore, Miranda must go. But if, after Miranda is gone,
the same problems still persist, what constitutional guarantee will have to be
sacrificed next?260
If nothing else, we hope that this proposal can help to move the debate to a
slightly more reasonable position on the ideological spectrum. After all, the
evolving content of the due process clause in no small measure reflects this coun-
try's maturation as a civilized society. Surely the movement from the early deci-
sions prohibiting physical brutality in the extraction of confessions to Miranda's
prophylactic rules bespeaks that truth. The trend has been to give more not less,
to go forward not back, to refine rights rather than coarsen them. In this sense,
the Warren Court was mainstream, and the Burger and Rehnquist Courts are
aberrational. History dictates that we should examine how to strengthen fifth
amendment protection rather than eviscerate it.
And that, Peter Parker, is supporting the law, not the lawless.
not been significant." White, supra note 19, at 19 n.99. See, e.g., Griffiths & Ayres, A Postcript to the
Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Protesters, 77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967); Medalie, Zeitz & Alex-
ander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital. The Attempt to Implement Miranda,
66 MICH. L. REV. 1347 (1968); Special Project, Interrogation in New Haven, The Impact of Miranda,
76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967).
260. In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989), the Court
upheld a drug testing program for certain Customs Service employees without warrant or reasonable
suspicion, despite the lack of a narcotics problem among such employees. In his dissent, Justice
Scalia called the challenged rules "a kind of immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic
opposition to drug use." Id. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The only perceived basis that Justice
Scalia found for these rules was as a symbol of the government's "war on drugs," to which he
responded: "I think it obvious that this justification is unacceptable; that the impairment of individ-
ual liberties cannot be the means of making a point; that symbolism, even symbolism for so worthy a
cause as the abolition of unlawful drugs, cannot validate an otherwise unreasonable search." Id. at
1401 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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